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INTRODUCTION 
In January 2015, the Meitiv children, ages ten and six, were 
permitted to do a short walk on their own, from the neighborhood 
playground back to their home in Silver Spring, Maryland.1 Their 
parents designed this exercise to help the children develop some 
independence and self-sufficiency, and did so only after the children 
had completed other smaller challenges to prepare them for this one.2 
But the parenting lesson was quickly disrupted when someone saw the 
children walking alone and reported it to the police.3 The children were 
picked up by police, the father was threatened with removal of the 
children from his custody, and the State of Maryland commenced an 
abuse and neglect investigation.4 The Meitivs identify their approach as 
 
 1 Donna St. George, Parents Investigated for Neglect After Letting Kids Walk Home Alone, 
WASH. POST (Jan. 14, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/maryland-
couple-want-free-range-kids-but-not-all-do/2015/01/14/d406c0be-9c0f-11e4-bcfb-
059ec7a93ddc_story.html. 
 2 Id. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Id. (“[A] CPS worker required [Mr. Meitiv] to sign a safety plan pledging he would not 
leave his children unsupervised until the following Monday, when CPS would follow up. At 
first he refused, saying he needed to talk to a lawyer, his wife said, but changed his mind when 
he was told his children would be removed if he did not comply.”). 
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“‘free-range’ parenting,”5 a child-rearing philosophy that is a conscious 
reaction to and rejection of the recent trend toward “helicopter” 
parenting.6 But the caller and the police apparently felt that the Meitivs 
were exposing their children to unacceptable levels of danger.7 
At the core of the conflict is the ongoing debate about what 
constitutes responsible parenting in a world increasingly obsessed with 
child safety. While statistics show that children are dramatically safer 
today than ever before,8 media sensationalization of stranger abduction 
cases, and other potential dangers in the world, are prompting parents 
to err on the side of overprotection.9 There is mounting evidence that 
such overprotection does more harm than good,10 but parents, like the 
Meitivs, who resist the hyper-parenting trend, are running afoul of the 
legal system. 
The Meitivs’ story is not an isolated one. Recent news items include 
other examples of parents arrested—or otherwise subjected to state 
intervention through the state’s Child Protective Services (CPS) 
agency—for allowing their children to play in neighborhood parks,11 or 
to walk to or from school,12 or stay home alone,13 without continuous 
 
 5 Id. 
 6 LENORE SKENAZY, FREE-RANGE KIDS: HOW TO RAISE SAFE, SELF-RELIANT CHILDREN 
(2010). The term “helicopter parents” refers to parents “who hover over-protectively around 
their children.” Elizabeth G. Porter, Tort Liability in the Age of the Helicopter Parent, 64 ALA. L. 
REV. 533, 536 (2013). 
 7 St. George, supra note 1. 
 8 BRYAN CAPLAN, SELFISH REASONS TO HAVE MORE KIDS: WHY BEING A GREAT PARENT IS 
LESS WORK AND MORE FUN THAN YOU THINK 96 (2011) (“Conditions today aren’t merely 
better [than they were in the 1950s]. They improved so much that government statisticians 
changed their denominator [for youth mortality] from deaths per 1,000 to deaths per 
100,000.”). 
 9 David Pimentel, Criminal Child Neglect and the “Free Range Kid”: Is Overprotective 
Parenting the New Standard of Care?, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 947, 963–66 (2012). 
 10 Gaia Bernstein & Zvi Triger, Over-Parenting, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1221, 1274–78 
(2011). Professors Bernstein and Triger have outlined numerous psychological effects that 
Intensive Parenting has on the first generation of intensively parented children. Id. These 
negative effects include dependency and inability to cope with life’s challenges; inability “to 
manage their time, strategize, and negotiate open conflict during play”; decreased “creativity, 
spontaneity, [and] enjoyment . . . than children raised under different child rearing practices”; 
decreased empathy; and immaturity. Id. at 1275–76. If the law forces parents to subscribe to 
Intensive Parenting norms, it may undermine the critical role of parents to instill in their 
children a sense of independence and the ability to successfully separate from their parents. Id. 
at 1274; Hara Estroff Marano, A Nation of Wimps, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Nov. 1, 2004), https://
www.psychologytoday.com/articles/200411/nation-wimps. “Harvard psychologist Jerome 
Kagan has shown unequivocally that what creates anxious children is parents hovering and 
protecting them from stressful experiences.” Id.; see also L.J. Jackson, Smothering Mothering: 
‘Helicopter Parents’ Are Landing Big in Child Care Cases, 96 A.B.A. J. 18, 18–19 (2010) 
(referencing “the psychological harm that overprotection may lead to in child rearing”). 
 11 E.g., Conor Friedersdorf, Working Mom Arrested for Letting Her 9-Year-Old Play Alone 
at Park, ATLANTIC (July 15, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2014/07/
arrested-for-letting-a-9-year-old-play-at-the-park-alone/374436. 
 12 See infra text accompanying notes 111–12 (discussing the Jonesboro, Arkansas case). 
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parental supervision. The spate of news items suggests a trend toward 
enhanced, arguably invasive, scrutiny of parents, with the state second-
guessing the parenting decisions they make, and intervening whenever 
they disagree with the parents’ judgment call. 
The interventions are a problem not just for parents who have 
affirmatively chosen a “free range” approach to child-rearing. The 
degree of supervision demanded by these new highly protective 
parenting norms are simply beyond the reach of many families less 
privileged than the Meitivs. Single parents in low-paying jobs cannot 
afford nannies to do the helicoptering for them.14 Children in large 
families—the larger family sizes correlating strongly with non-white 
ethnicities15—cannot expect to get the same level of individualized 
parental attention that upper-middle class white America now deems to 
be standard.16 
 
 13 Leah Barkoukis, Children Taken from Parents for a Month for Waiting Alone in 
Backyard, TOWNHALL.COM (June 9, 2015, 6:04 PM), http://townhall.com/tipsheet/
leahbarkoukis/2015/06/09/parental-rights-vs-government-boy-11-plays-basketball-in-own-
yard-as-he-awaits-delayed-parents-cops-take-him--brother-away-for-a-month-n2010171; 
Lenore Skenazy, 11-Year-Old Boy Played in His Yard. CPS Took Him, Felony Charge for 
Parents, REASON: HIT & RUN BLOG (June 11, 2015, 11:35 AM), https://reason.com/blog/2015/
06/11/11-year-old-boy-played-in-his-yard-cps-t. 
 14 Shanesha Taylor attracted national attention when she, attempting to find work to 
support her two young children, left them in the car while she interviewed for a job. “To many 
she represented the plight of single and underemployed parents who face tough decisions each 
day related to child care.” Emanuella Grinberg, When Justice is ‘Merciful’ in Child Abuse Cases, 
CNN (Aug. 7, 2014, 1:33 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/08/07/living/shanesha-taylor-plea-
deal. 
 15 Family Size, By Race and Ethnicity, PEW RES. CTR. (May 7, 2015), http://
www.pewsocialtrends.org/2015/05/07/childlessness-falls-family-size-grows-among-highly-
educated-women/st_2015-05-07_childlessness-12 (showing that Hispanic women, ages forty to 
forty-four, are nearly twice as likely as white women to have four or more children (in 1994, 
28% of Hispanic women aged forty to forty-four had four or more kids, and in 2014, that 
number was still at 20%, while only 11% of white women aged forty to forty-four had that 
many kids over that same twenty-year span)). 
 16 WASH. RISK ASSESSMENT PROJECT, MULTI-CULTURAL GUIDELINES FOR ASSESSING 
FAMILY STRENGTHS AND RISK FACTORS IN CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES 35 (Peter J. Pecora & 
Diana J. English eds., 1993). 
Issues of lack of supervision of young children surface most frequently in referrals for 
Native American and Hispanic families. Older, but still young children are expected 
to care for their younger siblings. In Native American families, being responsible for 
one’s siblings, is an indication of maturity and ability. In Hispanic families, especially 
migrant families, caring for younger siblings may be [a] role associated with younger 
children’s contribution to family survival. 
Id. (citations omitted). Class is similarly correlated with levels of parental attention. Eleanor E. 
Maccoby, Middle Childhood in the Context of the Family, in DEVELOPMENT DURING MIDDLE 
CHILDHOOD: THE YEARS FROM SIX TO TWELVE 184, 207 (W. Andrew Collins ed., 1984) (“Major 
contrasts that have emerged with some consistency are that middle-class parents, compared 
with working- or lower-class parents: Have higher rates of interaction with their children and 
are more responsive to their children’s bids for attention.”).  
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The intrusions are made in the name of protecting children from 
harm, a public policy objective that is both easy to defend and hard to 
dismiss. But disruption of the family in this way—removing or even 
threatening to remove kids from their families—can do tremendous 
harm to children, the very children the state is trying to protect,17 and in 
many cases contravene the family’s fundamental liberty interests under 
the Fourteenth Amendment,18 and/or their Fourth Amendment rights 
against seizure of their children.19 Although the oft-cited “best interest 
of the child” standard, discussed in more detail infra,20 has no legal 
application to interventions like that which supplanted the Meitivs’ 
parenting choices, it appears that those doing the intervening are 
applying such a principle de facto to justify their actions.21 
Parents caught in this nightmare are well advised to cooperate 
quickly, apologize profusely, and promise it won’t happen again—
effectively waiving their rights to raise their children as they see fit—in 
order to avoid having their children taken away from them.22 But unless 
they assert their constitutional rights in these cases, those rights will not 
be litigated or adjudicated. Indeed, it appears that in many of these 
cases, those rights are being disregarded altogether. 
What we need is a better conception of how the rights of parents 
come into play when the state attempts to rein in free-range parents, or 
any parent who does not fully implement the child-safety-obsessed 
orthodoxy of twenty-first century parenting. The existing case law 
suggests that the enforcement of overprotective parenting norms in 
society is, at worst, a gross violation of the constitutional rights of 
parents, and at best, a severe chilling of those rights. The legal system, 
therefore, is taking sides in the debate over what constitutes ideal 
parenting and, through individuals purporting to act in the best 
interests of children,23 is bullying parents into adhering to hyper-
 
 17 See David Pimentel, Fearing the Bogeyman: How the Legal System’s Overreaction to 
Perceived Danger Threatens Families and Children, 42 PEPP. L. REV. 235, 274–75 (2015). 
 18 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000) (“[I]t cannot now be doubted that the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment [of the U.S. Constitution] protects the 
fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of 
their children.”); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982). 
 19 In re Stumbo, 582 S.E.2d 255 (N.C. 2003) (holding that an anonymous report that an 
unsupervised two-year-old was naked in the driveway was insufficient to constitute “neglect” 
under the state’s and county’s investigations policy, so CPS was not within its authority to effect 
a Fourth Amendment seizure of the family’s children–separating them from their parents and 
interviewing them in private–as part of its required investigation.). 
 20 See discussion infra Section I.E. 
 21 See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 111–12 (discussing the police officer’s 
explanation of his actions in the Jonesboro, Arkansas case). 
 22 See infra text accompanying note 92. 
 23 See Painter v. Bannister, 140 N.W.2d 152 (Iowa 1966), where the Iowa Supreme Court 
applied a “best interest of the child” standard to deprive a father of custody of his child, based 
on the court’s own value-laden conception of what constituted a proper upbringing—turning 
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protective parenting norms. Lost in that process are the constitutional 
rights of parents, as well as the benefit—both to the children themselves 
and to society as a whole—that comes from respecting parental dignity 
and family integrity.24 
A clearer articulation of parental rights, and a more robust 
assertion of those rights, is overdue.25 Moreover, protecting the rights of 
parents to parent as they see fit—safeguarding their discretion in 
parenting, including issues of risk-management for their children—is 
likely to do far more to advance the interests of children than the 
emerging pattern of state intervention can hope to achieve.26 
This Article proceeds in six parts. First is an explanation of why 
some parents choose to adopt a less-protective approach to parenting, a 
decision that may be prompted by free-range parenting philosophy, by 
resource constraints, or by cultural traditions. That Part also explores 
why the rights of these parents go unasserted, unadjudicated, and 
unenforced, as well as how the concept of the “best interest of the child” 
is often misapplied in these cases. 
The second Part sets forth the constitutional basis for the rights of 
parents over the care, custody, and control of their children, arguing 
that encroachment of such fundamental liberty interests must be 
subjected to strict scrutiny. 
Third, the Article explores the tension inherent in a parent’s rights 
vis-à-vis the competing rights of children, of the state, and of the other 
parent, in light of the fact that the parent is not typically exercising these 
 
its nose up at the father’s “unconventional, arty, Bohemian” life, in favor of the more “stable” 
and conventional environment offered by the grandparents. As a rule, a court should not apply 
a “best interests of the child” standard unless and until the parent is found by a court to be 
“unfit.” See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68 (Justice O’Connor observed “there is a presumption that fit 
parents act in the best interests of their children.”); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) 
(discussing unfitness). But this constitutional limit is not consistently applied, as the State of 
Washington violated this principle in Troxel, more than twenty-five years after Stanley. Troxel, 
530 U.S. 57. 
 24 MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, WHAT’S WRONG WITH CHILDREN’S RIGHTS 37, 47 (2005). 
 25 The British legal system presents a cautionary tale, as expanded recognition of the rights 
of children has threatened to swallow up the concept of parents’ rights altogether. Noted British 
scholar Alexander McCall Smith observes:  
So strong has the best interest principle become that the question needs to be 
addressed as to whether there is anything left of parental rights . . . . The gradual 
demotion of parental rights . . . may be viewed as another example of the gradually 
encroaching power of the interventionist state in the area of the bringing up of 
children.  
Alexander McCall Smith, Is Anything Left of Parental Rights?, in FAMILY RIGHTS: FAMILY LAW 
AND MEDICAL ADVANCE 9, 18 (Elaine Sutherland & Alexander McCall Smith eds., 1990). 
 26 See, e.g., GUGGENHEIM, supra note 24, at 37–38 (“Parents . . . receiving maximum 
discretion to carry out their responsibilities [are] free from the worry that their behavior will be 
monitored and second-guessed by a third party. Children obviously benefit from rules that are 
calculated to reduce stress in their home.”). 
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rights for his own benefit (and in that sense, they may not be “his” 
rights), but for the benefit of another, namely his child. 
The fourth Part explores how parental duties are inseparably 
connected to those rights. Here, the principle of fiduciary duty offers 
some insight into the roles and rights of parents to exercise their 
judgment, for the benefit of another, without fear of liability or of being 
second-guessed by the state. 
Fifth, the Article notes that solutions to the problem of unenforced 
rights may lie in the implementation of parents’ procedural rights in 
these cases, most notably the right to counsel. 
The sixth Part highlights the overarching problem that the system’s 
failure to enforce and protect parents’ rights in these cases threatens to 
chill their exercise. Fear of state intervention will force parents’ hands in 
their parenting choices, undermining family autonomy as well as the 
best interests of the children. 
I.     THE PROBLEM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS FOR FREE-RANGE PARENTS 
A.     What is Free-Range Parenting? 
To a large degree, free-range parenting is a reaction to the present-
day obsession with child-safety, and the emerging parenting norms that 
reflect those fears. Despite the fact that “stranger danger” is an irrational 
fear that has been largely debunked,27 it is widely considered unsafe to 
let kids play in parks or walk to school without the constant supervision 
of an adult.28 Preteen babysitters, sandlot baseball, bike riding in the 
neighborhood, and tree-climbing, once staples of childhood in America, 
are now relics of history.29 If children get outdoors at all these days, it is 
 
 27 A simple web search of “Stranger Danger Myth” draws dozens of hits. E.g., David 
Finkelhor, Opinion, Five Myths About Missing Children, WASH. POST (May 10, 2013), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/five-myths-about-missing-children/2013/05/10/efee398c-
b8b4-11e2-aa9e-a02b765ff0ea_story.html. 
 28 This preconceived notion that children are not safe without constant parental 
supervision may be correlated to a study illustrating a trend that Americans today are far less 
trusting of others compared to previous generations. Specifically, a study has shown that 
Americans born before the 1930s were twice as trusting of others and likely to engage in 
community projects, in comparison to their grandchildren. Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: 
America’s Declining Social Capital, 6 J. DEMOCRACY 65 (1995). See further discussion of 
Putnam’s work infra text accompanying notes 31–33. 
 29 Dennis Cauchon, Childhood Pastimes are Increasingly Moving Indoors: Fishing, Biking 
and Sports Giving Way to Video Games, USA TODAY (July 12, 2005), http://
usatoday30.usatoday.com/educate/college/education/articles/20050717.htm (“The fundamental 
nature of American childhood has changed in a single generation. The unstructured outdoor 
childhood—days of pick-up baseball games, treehouses and ‘be home for dinner’—has all but 
vanished.”). 
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typically in organized sports leagues, with redundant parental 
supervision, which they travel to and from in minivans or SUVs, 
strapped into car seats.30 
The appeal of the “stranger danger” myth, and the obsession with 
child protection, may have complex and multi-faceted roots. Robert 
Putnam’s 2000 book Bowling Alone documents a profound societal shift, 
describing “how we have become increasingly disconnected from 
family, friends, neighbors, and our democratic structures.”31 This 
waning sense of community is another reason that people may not allow 
their children out in the neighborhoods; people are less likely to know 
their neighbors, much less trust them.32 In an environment of increased 
alienation and distrust, it is only natural that parents would close ranks 
around their kids, sealing them off from the community that had, for 
previous generations, provided some kind of informal social safety net.33 
Disconnected from their communities, families are far more likely to 
“go it alone,” assuming full responsibility for their children’s welfare, 
rather than relying on the community as a whole to join in the 
oversight, protection, and nurturing of the neighborhood’s children.34 
 
 30 Id. (“When children do go outside, it tends to be for scheduled events—soccer camp or a 
fishing derby—held under the watch of adults. In a typical week, 27% of kids ages 9 to 13 play 
organized baseball, but only 6% play on their own, a survey by the Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention found.”). 
 31 About the Book, BOWLING ALONE, http://bowlingalone.com (last visited Jan. 28, 2016) 
(describing Robert D. Putnam’s book Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American 
Community). 
 32 Thomas H. Sander & Robert D. Putnam, Still Bowling Alone? The Post-9/11 Split, 21 J. 
DEMOCRACY 9, 9–10 (2010). 
 33 Putnam speculates about the causes of this trend, including (1) the entry of women into 
the workforce, (2) geographic mobility that “disrupt[s] root systems,” (3) demographic changes 
(“fewer marriages, more divorces, fewer children” etc.), and (4) “the technological 
transformation of leisure” including a shift from socialization toward TV watching. Putnam, 
supra note 28, at 73–75. Exactly why it has happened is not particularly important to this 
analysis; the fact that it has happened appears to be having an enormous effect on modern 
conceptions of parenting. 
 34 The 1996 book It Takes a Village, by then-First Lady Hillary Clinton, took its title from 
the African-attributed proverb “It takes a village to raise a child,” and promoted the idea that 
responsibility for a child goes far beyond the child’s immediate family–that outside people and 
groups can have great impact on a child’s life as well. HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, IT TAKES A 
VILLAGE AND OTHER LESSONS CHILDREN TEACH US (1996). The message was promptly 
politicized, however, when Senator and presidential candidate Bob Dole referenced it in his 
acceptance speech at the Republican National Convention that year, pushing back on the 
notion of community responsibility: 
And after the virtual devastation of the American family, the rock upon which this 
country was founded, we are told that it takes a village . . . . [W]ith all due respect, I 
am here to tell you it does not take a village to raise a child. It takes a family to raise a 
child. 
Senator Robert Dole, Speech to the Republican National Convention (Aug. 15, 1996), http://
www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/1996/conventions/san.diego/transcripts/0815/dole.fdch.shtml. 
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This shift is also evident from the fact that neighbors, seeing young 
children unattended, respond not by trying to help the kids, but by 
calling the police and reporting the parents.35 
Free-range parents, in contrast, mourn the loss of freedom for 
today’s kids, and argue that kids are actually far worse off because of 
these “safety” measures. Today’s kids spend far more time indoors on 
sedentary activities, including “screen time,” contributing to a spike in 
the problem of childhood obesity, and a range of other developmental 
problems.36 Others have argued that today’s coddled kids not only lose a 
sense of discovery and exploration when they are kept home and under 
nonstop adult supervision, they are deprived of an opportunity to 
develop self-sufficiency and or to learn to take responsibility for 
themselves.37 Infantilizing kids as they grow up, in an attempt to keep 
them safe, has also contributed to problems at universities, where 
undergraduate deans complain that freshmen depend on their parents 
to solve their problems and navigate the system.38 
 
Senator Dole’s message, however, was not pushing back on neighborhood and community 
support for parents and their children, but on state interventions in the family:  
[W]e are told that it takes a village, that is collective, and thus the state, to raise a 
child. The state is now more involved than it ever has been in the raising of children. 
And children are now more neglected, more abused and more mistreated than they 
have been in our time. This is not a coincidence.  
Id. 
 35 See, e.g., Donna St. George, supra note 1 (discussing the Meitivs’ story); see also Nicole 
Comstock, Sacramento Mother Faces Child Endangerment Charges for Allowing 4-Year-Old Son 
to Play Outside Alone, FOX 40 (Nov. 19, 2015, 10:53 PM), http://fox40.com/2015/11/19/
sacramento-mother-faces-child-endangerment-charges-for-allowing-4-year-old-son-to-play-
outside-alone (“A Sacramento mother faces jail time for letting her 4-year-old son play alone at 
an outdoor playground 120 feet from her front door. ‘He was outside and the neighbor called 
the cops on us,’ the boy’s mother, Sonya Hendren, said.”). 
 36 See, e.g., Cynthia Ogden & Margaret Carroll, Prevalence of Obesity Among Children and 
Adolescents: United States, Trends 1963–1965 Through 2007–2008 (2010), CENTERS FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hestat/obesity_child_07_08/obesity_
child_07_08.pdf.; Television Watching and “Sit Time”, HARVARD T.H. CHAN SCH. OF PUB. 
HEALTH: OBESITY PREVENTION SOURCE, https://www.hsph.harvard.edu/obesity-prevention-
source/obesity-causes/television-and-sedentary-behavior-and-obesity (“This article briefly 
outlines the research on how TV viewing and other sedentary activities contribute to obesity 
risk, and why reducing screen time and sedentary time are important targets for obesity 
prevention.”). 
 37 LENORE SKENAZY, FREE-RANGE KIDS: GIVING OUR CHILDREN THE FREEDOM WE HAD 
WITHOUT GOING NUTS WITH WORRY, at xx–xxi (2009); see also Bernstein & Triger, supra note 
10, at 1275 (stating that the heavy monitoring involved in “Intensive Parenting” has been 
shown to prevent children from developing independence, self-sufficiency, and the coping skills 
needed to handle the hardships of life). 
 38 E.g., JULIE LYTHCOTT-HAIMS, HOW TO RAISE AN ADULT: BREAK FREE OF THE 
OVERPARENTING TRAP AND PREPARE YOUR KID FOR SUCCESS 6–7 (2015) (“What will become of 
young adults who look accomplished on paper but seem to have a hard time making their way 
in the world without the constant involvement of their parents?”). Lythcott-Haims served as 
Dean of Freshman and Undergraduate Advising at Stanford University before writing her book. 
Kate Chesley, Lythcott-Haims Stepping Down as Dean of Freshmen and Undergraduate 
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Yet free-range parents are coming under attack, for endangering 
their children, when they refuse to hover or to coddle their kids. Much 
of the problem comes from failing to appreciate the risk-management 
role of parents. Anything a parent does to protect a child from one risk 
is likely to increase another risk. Driving a child to school may protect 
him from the nearly negligible risk of stranger abduction, but it also 
subjects the child to the far more likely dangers of traveling in a motor 
vehicle, of developing a sense of dependency, and of lack of exercise. 
Indeed, the American Academy of Pediatrics has published statistics 
suggesting that “being driven to school in a passenger vehicle is by far 
the most dangerous way to get there.”39 
The Meitivs, of course, are consciously choosing to give their kids a 
long leash, based on their own convictions about what is best for their 
kids. Kids who are capable of fending for themselves, the theory goes, 
are far safer (not to mention happier and more successful) than kids 
who are sheltered from the world by the smothering safety constraints 
imposed by hovering parents.40 The latter kids are more vulnerable to 
the world, and seriously at risk, the minute their parents are not present. 
But the self-sufficient, free-range kid will be in a position to deal with 
unanticipated difficulties in life, and navigate them without parental 
hand-holding.41 
The legal issue arises only because free-range parents, like the 
Meitivs, are being targeted by law enforcement authorities and by Child 
Protective Services agencies. Other parents, who may not adhere to the 
free-range philosophy per se, but who have engaged in more relaxed 
approaches to child supervision—because of, e.g., cultural factors or 
socio-economic factors—have been similarly implicated. Fueled by the 
growing obsession with child safety in our society, police now appear to 
be responding whenever someone who disapproves of another’s 
parenting calls 911 and reports an “endangered” child. The parents are 
then threatened with devastating consequences: criminal records and 
jail time; having their children taken away from them (temporarily or 
 
Advising, STANFORD NEWS (Mar. 28, 2012), http://news.stanford.edu/news/2012/march/
lythcott-haims-leaving-032812.html. 
 39 Jane E. Brody, Turning the Ride to School into a Walk, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2007), http://
www.nytimes.com/2007/09/11/health/11brod.html. “Driving your third-grader to the store is 
vastly more dangerous than leaving him home without a bodyguard.” CAPLAN, supra note 8, at 
29. 
 40 See Ramon Resa, Problems with Overprotective Parents: Why Letting Children Play in 
Dirt is Healthy, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 17, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ramon-
resa-md/problems-with-overprotect_b_262209.html. 
 41 CARL HONORÉ, UNDER PRESSURE: RESCUING OUR CHILDREN FROM THE CULTURE OF 
HYPER-PARENTING 248 (2009) (“Children are a lot more resilient and robust than we give them 
credit for. . . . [A] few knocks along the way are unlikely to scar anyone for life; they might even 
make them stronger.”). 
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permanently); and even when charges are dropped, getting listed on 
“child abuse” registries.42 
The structure of our legal system has created and exacerbated these 
problems as explored in my two earlier articles.43 Among the key points 
in those articles is recognition of the fact that parenting is an exercise in 
risk management. When parents act to protect their children from one 
danger, they almost always subject that child to another one. Allowing a 
child to walk to school unaccompanied creates some risk, however 
small, of stranger abduction; but driving a child to school to insulate her 
from that risk puts her in a moving vehicle, arguably the most 
dangerous place for a child today.44 Allowing children to play in the 
neighborhood, ride bikes to the park, and join in outdoor games with 
other neighborhood children, certainly exposes them to some risk; but 
keeping them indoors where they will be “safe,” watching TV or playing 
video games, certainly exposes them to a variety of other harms 
including the newest epidemic of child obesity.45 Allowing a teenager to 
play high school football is certainly dangerous,46 but given the social 
advantages high school athletes enjoy, as well as the physical exercise 
and the potential to keep young men busy and out of trouble,47 a large 
number of parents opt to let them play. If parents face liability for 
exposing children to risk, they have lost before they begin, because the 
risks cannot be eliminated, only managed, and the state appears to be all 
too ready to second-guess their judgments. 
 
 42 Listing on these registries can have serious consequences for those listed. Once a person 
is listed, it is typically impossible for her to get a job teaching or working with children, or 
caring for the elderly or vulnerable. If presently employed in such a profession, she is likely to 
be fired summarily. Also, inclusion in a registry can have devastating consequences to the 
parent in child-custody disputes that may arise later. See Eric D. Lawrence, Change is on the 
Way for Registry of Neglect: Some Critics Call Michigan’s Database a Permanent Blacklist, 
DETROIT FREE PRESS, (Mar. 24, 2014), http://freep.newspapers.com/image/105074767. See also 
infra note 95 (discussing how and when the state’s stigmatizing of individuals in this way can 
trigger due process protections). 
 43 Pimentel, supra note 17; Pimentel, supra note 9. 
 44 The American Academy of Pediatrics has published statistics suggesting that “being 
driven to school in a passenger vehicle is by far the most dangerous way to get there.” Brody, 
supra note 39. “Driving your third-grader to the store is vastly more dangerous than leaving 
him at home without a bodyguard.” CAPLAN, supra note 8, at 29. 
 45 Childhood Obesity Facts, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (June 19, 2015), 
http://www.cdc.gov/obesity/data/childhood.html; Television Watching and “Sit Time”, supra 
note 36. 
 46 See Ken Reed, Opinion, Game Over for Concussion Debate, USA TODAY (Mar. 6, 2015, 
12:26 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2015/03/06/youth-sports-avoidance-
behavior-column/24383229. 
 47 RYAN HEDSTROM & DANIEL GOULD, INST. FOR THE STUDY OF YOUTH SPORTS, RESEARCH 
IN YOUTH SPORTS: CRITICAL ISSUES STATUS 4–8 (2004), http://www.pysc.org/projects/
documents/ResearchinYouthSports-CriticalIssuesStatus.pdf. 
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Again, these issues and problems have been addressed elsewhere, 
but the constitutional rights of these parents, faced with accusations and 
investigations, is a matter demanding further attention. 
B.     Imperfect and Struggling Parents 
The problem is not limited to those who consciously identify 
themselves—like the Meitivs—as “free-range” parents. Most of the 
parents who run afoul of the new parenting orthodoxy, and who endure 
state intrusions into their homes and families, are just ordinary people 
attempting to do something that is extraordinarily difficult, i.e., raising 
young children. Parents have been faced with similar child-rearing 
challenges for millennia, and it does not appear to be getting easier. In 
the process, most (I daresay all) parents suffer momentary lapses of 
judgment and make mistakes, prompted perhaps by exhaustion, 
frustration, or limited resources (both material and emotional).48 
Human weakness, even human frailty,49 can be forgiven in almost every 
endeavor, it would appear, except parenting which, ironically, may be 
the most difficult thing most people will do in their lives.50 Put on top of 
the fact that a large percentage of parents in America are doing this for 
the first time,51 and the unfairness of holding parents to standards of 
 
 48 The Supreme Court has addressed this concern in the context of parental termination 
proceedings. In raising the constitutional minimum standard to clear and convincing in these 
proceedings, a factor the Supreme Court considered was “the possible risk that a factfinder 
might decide to [deprive] an individual based solely on a few isolated instances of unusual 
conduct [or] . . . idiosyncratic behavior.” Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 764 (1982) (quoting 
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 427 (1979)). 
 49 In the classic film, The Philadelphia Story, the character flaw of Tracy Lord was that she 
had no “regard for human frailty.” The Philadelphia Story: Comprehensive Storyform, 
DRAMATICA, http://dramatica.com/analysis/the-philadelphia-story (last visited Feb. 19, 2016). 
Her ex-husband calls her out on it: “You’ll never be a first class human being . . . until you’ve 
learned to have some regard for human frailty.” The Philidelphia Story: Quotes, IMDB, http://
www.imdb.com/title/tt0032904/quotes (last visited July 16, 2016). 
 50 See, e.g., Kirsten Brunner, Yes, Parenting IS the Hardest Job, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 14, 
2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/kirsten-brunner/yes-parenting-is-the-hardest-job_b_
5974712.html. 
 51  
The problem may be exacerbated by demographic shifts to smaller families. It means 
that inexperienced parents are raising a far greater proportion of children. When it 
was common to have four children in a family, 75% of children were raised by 
parents who had ‘done this before,’ raising an older sibling. When the average family 
size in the United States—for families with children—drops to less than two children 
per family, a majority of children in the United States will be raised by parents doing 
this for the first time. And if those parents grew up in small households themselves, 
the likelihood that they participated in or even witnessed the rearing of younger 
siblings is dramatically diminished as well.  
Pimentel, supra note 17, at 288–89 (footnotes omitted). 
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perfection—where nothing less than the “best” interest of the child is 
sufficient to meet legal requirements—is manifest. 
The parents who are struggling—particularly single parent families 
of limited means—are particularly vulnerable, as they can’t afford to be 
stay-at-home parents, or to hire nannies,52 to provide the constant 
supervision now expected. Even simple matters like Shanesha Taylor’s 
seeking a job,53 Debra Harrell’s going to work,54 or Kim Brooks’s 
making a quick run into the store,55 when they couldn’t or didn’t take 
their kids with them, have generated horrific encounters with the law. 
Both Taylor and Harrell were poor, single, women of color.56 Taylor was 
employed only part time, and left her kids in the car while she 
interviewed for a desperately-needed job.57 As one commentator put it, 
“To many she represented the plight of single and underemployed 
parents who face tough decisions each day related to child care.”58 
Harrell was employed at McDonald’s, and her nine-year-old 
daughter begged to be allowed to play at the park rather than hang out 
in McDonald’s during her mother’s full shift.59 Both of these moms 
faced very few options before these incidents, and even fewer options 
after they had been charged with serious crimes for what amounts to 
“parenting while impoverished.”60 
 
 52 See CHILD CARE AWARE OF AM., PARENTS AND THE HIGH COST OF CHILD CARE (2014), 
http://www.arizonachildcare.org/pdf/2014-child-care-cost-report.pdf; Danielle Paquette, The 
Staggering Cost of Day Care When You Make Only the Minimum Wage, WASH. POST: 
WONKBLOG (Oct. 6, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/10/06/the-
staggering-cost-of-daycare-when-you-make-only-the-minimum-wage. 
 53 See Grinberg, supra note 14 (discussing the story of Shanesha Taylor, an unemployed 
mother who left her kids long enough to interview for a job, only to be arrested for leaving 
them). Taylor was ultimately sentenced to eighteen years probation. Sarah Jarvis, Mom Who 
Left Kids in Car Sentenced to 18 Years Probation, USA TODAY (May 15, 2015, 8:39 PM), http://
www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2015/05/15/shanesha-taylor-kids-in-car/27375405. 
 54 Debra Harrell, of South Carolina, was arrested after letting her nine-year-old play in the 
park while she went to her job at McDonald’s. Friedersdorf, supra note 11. 
 55 Kim Brooks, The Day I Left My Son in the Car, SALON (June 3, 2014, 7:00 PM), http://
www.salon.com/2014/06/03/the_day_i_left_my_son_in_the_car (“I made a split-second 
decision to run into the store. I had no idea it would consume the next years of my life.”). 
 56 See Friedersdorf, supra note 11; Chris Branch, An Important Conversation About the 
Mom Arrested for Leaving Her Kid at A Park, HUFFINGTON POST (July 16, 2014, 5:33 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/07/16/single-mom-jail-child-unattended-park_n_
5592799.html; Grinberg, supra note 14. The fact that Harrell was employed at McDonald’s 
supports the inference that she was low income. Branch, supra. The fact that Taylor was 
employed only part time while actively seeking full-time employment supports a similar 
inference. Shaila Dewan, A Job Seeker’s Desperate Choice, N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 2014) http://
www.nytimes.com/2014/06/22/business/a-job-seekers-desperate-choice.html?. 
 57 See Dewan, supra note 56; Grinberg, supra note 14. 
 58 Grinberg, supra note 14. 
 59 Friedersdorf, supra note 11. 
 60 See Noah Remnick, Opinion, Debra Harrell and the Mythology of Bad Black Mothers, 
L.A. TIMES (July 18, 2014, 1:47 PM), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/opinion-la/la-ol-debra-
harrell-mythology-black-mothers-20140718-story.html. Commenting on Debra Harrell’s case 
in particular, Remnick exposed the harsh judgments of society against poor women of color: 
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In Santosky v. Kramer, which involved an attempt to terminate 
parental rights, the Supreme Court echoed this very concern: “Because 
parents subject to termination proceedings are often poor, uneducated, 
or members of minority groups, such proceedings are often vulnerable 
to judgments based on cultural or class bias.”61 
Kim Brooks’s experience was not so much related to poverty and 
race as coping the pressing demands of parenting young children, which 
is difficult for anyone. Attempting to meet deadlines, forestall tantrums, 
and meet family needs, she “did a quick risk-benefit analysis,” and then 
acceded to her four-year-old’s demand to remain in the car while she 
dashed into the store “for about five minutes.”62 The desperate anxiety 
of a parent in the moment—running late on a hard day—may have 
clouded her judgment.63 But parents of small children live their lives 
continually in such clouds of sleep deprivation, “anxiety, confusion, 
frustration, [and] depression.”64 
 
Unfortunately, the low-wage jobs attainable for most mothers lead to a parental 
quagmire. Between low paychecks and inflexible work schedules, how is one to 
arrange for adequate child care? With no apparent options, the answer is often that 
they simply cannot. Such women, it’s been repeated to you, are bad mothers who 
deserve to be punished, and increasingly we’re doing just that. Indeed, the mythology 
of bad black mothers was never just a part of our cultural folklore—it’s entrenched in 
our legal system. 
Id. The absent fathers in these stories, ironically enough, escape liability and blame because they 
have successfully foisted responsibility for the children on their mother. The mothers who are 
trying to do everything get blamed, and sometimes prosecuted, because they can’t do 
everything. The father, who does absolutely nothing, stands in the clear. 
 61 Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 763 (1982) (citation omitted). 
 62 Brooks, supra note 55. In her words, 
[My 4-year-old] glanced up at me, his eyes alight with what I’d come to recognize as 
a sort of pre-tantrum agitation. “No, no, no, no, no! I don’t want to go in,” he 
repeated, and turned back to his game. 
I took a deep breath. I looked at the clock. For the next four or five seconds, I did 
what it sometimes seems I’ve been doing every minute of every day since having 
children, a constant, never-ending risk-benefit analysis. I noted that it was a mild, 
overcast, 50-degree day. I noted how close the parking spot was to the front door, 
and that there were a few other cars nearby. I visualized how quickly, unencumbered 
by a tantrumming 4-year-old, I would be, running into the store, grabbing a pair of 
child headphones. And then I did something I’d never done before. I left him. I told 
him I’d be right back. I cracked the windows and child-locked the doors and double-
clicked my keys so that the car alarm was set. And then I left him in the car for about 
five minutes. 
Id. 
 63 As she describes the circumstances, however, it is difficult to identify any significant risk 
that she exposed her child to: (1) not abduction, as the child was secured in a locked and 
alarmed car, (2) not heat, as the day was cool, the windows cracked, and the time in the car 
limited to “about five minutes.” Id. 
 64 Alice G. Walton, How to Enjoy the Often Exhausting, Depressing Role of Parenthood, 
ATLANTIC (Jan. 9, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2012/01/how-to-enjoy-
the-often-exhausting-depressing-role-of-parenthood/250901. 
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Accordingly, the issues of the rights of parents are not limited to 
the privileged few, who choose to indulge in free-range parenting as a 
favored approach to child-rearing. Any parent, facing the burdens and 
challenges that come with caring for children, will have a bad day, and 
will make a poor judgment call; he or she deserves some slack. And the 
rights of parents become, perhaps, most compelling in the case of the 
struggling parent who is desperately trying to hold her family together 
and for whom free-range parenting is not so much a conscious choice as 
a last resort. 
C.     Families from Other Cultural Traditions 
Enforcement of the new child-safety obsessed orthodoxy threatens 
not only those who are less advantaged socio-economically, it is also an 
attack on cultural and religious pluralism in America. Parenting 
methods and philosophies typically reflect the values of the family—
their faith and traditions—which may or may not align with modern 
parenting trends. 
In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Supreme Court recognized the cultural 
and religious foundation for, and afforded constitutional protection to, 
the parents’ decision to keep their daughter out of high school, in order 
to pursue a more traditional life in their Amish community.65 The 
decision came over the objections of the State, which argued that public 
policy, and the girl’s own interests, required school attendance, arguing 
that “education is necessary to prepare citizens to participate effectively 
and intelligently in our open political system if we are to preserve 
freedom and independence,” and that “education prepares individuals 
to be self-reliant and self-sufficient participants in society.”66 But the 
Supreme Court was sensitive to the cultural and religious foundations of 
the Amish community, according them a certain degree of deference 
and respect: “There is nothing in this record to suggest that the Amish 
qualities of reliability, self-reliance, and dedication to work would fail to 
find ready markets in today’s society.”67 Moreover, the Court readily 
acknowledged the value of cultural pluralism in our society, something 
that would be lost if we forced every family to conform to society’s 
preferred approach: “Even their idiosyncratic separateness exemplifies 
the diversity we profess to admire and encourage.”68 
It is not just the Supreme Court that has given formal recognition 
to the legitimacy of diverse cultural traditions in child-rearing. Congress 
 
 65 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
 66 Id. at 221. 
 67 Id. at 224. 
 68 Id. at 226. 
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passed the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) in 1978,69 precisely to 
defend the cultural claim of Native American communities to their own 
children. The statute was enacted “to address the long-standing practice 
of removing Indigenous children from their families and placing them 
with non-indigenous families in an effort to assimilate them into the 
majority culture.”70 The statute created strong presumptions for 
indigenous custody, granting parents a right to publicly funded 
counsel,71 and imposing a “clear and convincing evidence” standard for 
foster care placements, and a “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard for 
terminations of parental rights.72 The ICWA goes even further in the 
protection of cultural interests, recognizing not just the rights of 
indigenous parents, but also of the tribes, whose courts enjoy exclusive 
jurisdiction over child custody cases on their respective reservations.73 
Of course, beyond the defined communities of the Amish and of 
the sundry Native American tribes, American society is a 
conglomeration of diverse cultural traditions whose core values are 
often reflected in their approaches to family.74 Portions of the United 
States include large concentrations of Scandinavians, for example, for 
whom it may be traditional to have infants take their naps outdoors, 
often in sub-freezing conditions.75 The practice is not rooted merely in 
tradition, but in promoting health:  
The theory behind outdoor napping is that children exposed to fresh 
air, whether in summer or the depths of winter, are less likely to 
catch coughs and colds—and that spending a whole day in one room 
with 30 other children [at a day-care center] does them no good at 
all.76  
It is difficult to criticize these Scandinavian parenting norms, as all four 
of these countries are among the nine countries in the world with the 
lowest infant mortality rates (Finland first, Sweden fourth, Norway 
 
 69 Indian Child Welfare Act, 92 Stat. 3069 (1978) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. 
§§ 1901–1963 (2012)). 
 70 NAT’L INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ASS’N, THE CONTINUED REMOVAL OF INDIGENOUS 
CHILDREN FROM THEIR FAMILIES AND COMMUNITIES AND ITS IMPACT ON THE RIGHT TO 
CULTURE 1 (2014). 
 71 25 U.S.C. § 1912(b) (2012). 
 72 § 1912(e)–(f). 
 73 § 1911(a). 
 74 “It is through the family that we inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished 
values, moral and cultural.” Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503–04 (1977). 
 75 Helena Lee, The Babies Who Nap in Sub-Zero Temperatures, BBC NEWS (Feb. 22, 2013), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-21537988. Americans of Scandinavian descent may not 
practice this widely after a generation or more in the United States, but the practice is very 
much alive in those countries today. Id. 
 76 Id. There is research that shows that the children also sleep longer in the cold air. Id. 
(“While indoor naps lasted between one and two hours, outdoor naps lasted from 1.5 to three 
hours.”). 
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sixth, and Denmark ninth).77 The United States, where such a practice 
might be viewed as dangerous, is twenty-seventh.78 
Consistent with this, in Denmark it is also a generally accepted 
parenting practice to leave sleeping babies in their carriages outside a 
store or café, while the caregiver goes inside.79 The clash of cultures got 
a Danish mother into serious trouble in the 1990s when visiting New 
York.80 When she left her child in a stroller on the sidewalk to enter a 
restaurant, she was arrested for it, and her child was taken away.81 But 
the problem was largely one of perception and cultural expectations 
rather than parental neglect;82 it is unlikely that anyone would 
characterize Danish parenting as inherently inferior to American 
parenting, particularly given the excellent outcomes in Denmark.83 
In Japan, it is common for very young children to venture out, 
taking subways to and from school and otherwise running errands, 
unsupervised by an adult.84 “It’s a culturally indoctrinated 
 
 77 Christopher Ingraham, Our Infant Mortality Rate is a National Embarrassment, WASH. 
POST: WONKBLOG (Sept. 29, 2104), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/09/
29/our-infant-mortality-rate-is-a-national-embarrassment. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id.; Emily Lodish, Global Parenting Habits That Haven’t Caught On in the U.S., NPR 
(Aug. 12, 2014, 2:14 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2014/08/12/339825261/global-
parenting-habits-that-havent-caught-on-in-the-u-s. 
 80 Tony Marcano, Toddler, Left Outside Restaurant, Is Returned to Her Mother, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 14, 1997), http://www.nytimes.com/1997/05/14/nyregion/toddler-left-outside-restaurant-
is-returned-to-her-mother.html. 
 81 Id. 
 82 And in this case, the American legal system was willing to respect the cultural difference. 
When the situation was explained and understood, the charges were dropped and the child was 
returned to her parents. John Sullivan, Charges Against Danish Mother Are Dropped, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 17, 1997), http://www.nytimes.com/1997/05/17/nyregion/charges-against-danish-
mother-are-dropped.html. 
 83 One might argue that what constitutes good parenting in Denmark would be bad 
parenting in the United States, essentially because the higher U.S. crime rate places unattended 
children at much higher risk in the United States than in Denmark. The argument has some 
initial appeal, until the statistics are examined, and we see that kidnapping rates are about the 
same in Europe as on this side of the pond. Steven Perlberg, The 20 Countries Where People Get 
Kidnapped the Most, BUSINESS INSIDER (Dec. 12, 2013, 3:58 PM), http://
www.businessinsider.com/top-20-countries-by-kidnapping-2013-12. Once again, fear of 
kidnapping in the United States is far higher, but not necessarily because the risk is 
commensurately higher. Moreover, to the extent that crime rates are lower in Denmark, that 
fact would suggest that Danish child-rearing is getting something right, as their kids grow up to 
be law-abiding citizens, and perhaps U.S. parents should be doing more to emulate the Danes. 
 84 Amy S. Choi, How Cultures Around the World Think About Parenting, TED TALKS (July 
15, 2014), http://ideas.ted.com/how-cultures-around-the-world-think-about-parenting. 
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understanding that children are supposed to be independent by the time 
they start grade school, really, so that’s age six.”85 Parents who split time 
between Japan and the United States have to alter their parenting to 
conform to the expectations of others. As one Japanese mother 
observed: “‘If I let them out on their own like that in the U.S., I wouldn’t 
just get strange looks,’ she says. ‘Somebody would call Child Protective 
Services.’”86 
Families in Hispanic and Native American communities are far 
more likely to expect older children to take responsibility for younger 
children.87 Hispanic families have been larger on average,88 so the 
cultural practice may be born in part from practical necessity. Professors 
Bernstein and Triger, in their article on over-parenting, give a variety of 
other examples of cultural differences: 
Childrearing practices vary considerably across cultures. Many 
alternative formats of childcare exist where it is not necessarily the 
mother, the parents, or even a particular adult providing the care. In 
many societies across the world, siblings play a central role in 
providing care and instruction. While European-American families 
rarely use a babysitter under the age of twelve, in many societies five 
to ten year olds care for toddlers. In some cultures, grandparents play 
a central role in child rearing. In other societies, the children of 
several mothers mingle, and whoever is free takes care of them, 
regardless of whether they are her children or not. In many cultures, 
the assumption is that “the mother is often too busy to tend to the 
child.” In some cultures, “a mother is chastised by peers if she is 
overly fond of her child.”89 
In fact, there are many approaches to parenting, rooted in diverse 
cultural traditions, and parents should have a right to raise their 
 
In Japan, where Gross-Loh lives part of the year, she lets her 4-year-old daughter run 
errands with her 7-year-old sister and 11-year-old brother—without parental 
supervision. Her kids don’t hesitate to take the Tokyo subways by themselves and 
walk on busy streets alone, just like their Japanese peers. But when she comes back to 
the States, Gross-Loh doesn’t allow the same. “If I let them out on their own like that 
in the U.S., I wouldn’t just get strange looks,” she says. “Somebody would call Child 
Protective Services.” 
Id. 
 85 In Japan, First Graders Travel Solo to School on the Train, CBS NEWS (Dec. 15, 2015, 8:26 
AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/japanese-young-children-solo-commute-subway-school 
(quoting Teru Clavel, a Japanese-American sociologist featured in the story). 
 86 Choi, supra note 84. 
 87 WASH. RISK ASSESSMENT PROJECT, supra note 16, at 35. 
 88 Hispanic Family Size in USA Shrinking, POPULATION RES. INST. (June 10, 2015), https://
www.pop.org/content/hispanic-family-size-usa-shrinking (noting “the long tradition of large 
Hispanic families” and that “Hispanic immigrants are presently helping to bolster the U.S. 
birthrate”). 
 89 Bernstein & Triger, supra note 10, at 1267; see also id. at 1266–69 (section entitled 
“Intensive Parenting and Cultural and Ethnic Differences”). 
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children in a manner consistent with their means and their own cultural 
values. The suggestion that everyone in America must conform to the 
highly-protective norms that have emerged in mainstream American 
society runs contrary to pluralistic values. When the norms are enforced 
with threats to break up families or impose criminal punishment, it 
moves beyond mere ethno-centrism, and becomes a form of cultural 
imperialism. 
D.     The Unexamined Constitutional Rights of Parents 
While the Supreme Court has recognized that parents enjoy a 
fundamental liberty interest in their decisions about how to raise their 
children, those Fourteenth Amendment rights are not being adequately 
protected in the cases being brought against free-range parents. There is 
reason to believe that they are not even being asserted, and certainly not 
pressed at an appellate level in a way that might generate precedent for 
these cases in the future.90 
Typically, when parents are reported and either law enforcement or 
CPS arrives to assess the situation, the parents are likely to be afraid, 
desperately afraid, of one thing: having their children taken away from 
them.91 They understandably try to cooperate and to reassure the 
investigators that they can be trusted with the continuing care of their 
children.92 That often means the following: (1) ready admissions of 
 
 90 Guggenheim and Sankaran suggest that there may be issues of standing that would 
prevent parents from challenging the constitutionality of the state’s action in taking their 
children from them. MARTIN GUGGENHEIM & VIVEK S. SANKARAN, REPRESENTING PARENTS IN 
CHILD WELFARE CASES: ADVICE AND GUIDANCE FOR FAMILY DEFENDERS 36 (2015). 
 91 After publishing my first article on this subject, in which I speculated that fear of 
criminal liability may prompt parents to opt for an overprotective parenting style, I received a 
steady stream of email traffic from parents concerned about the issue, and they were not afraid 
of criminal liability. Their primary fear was that their children would be taken away from them. 
It is a curious thing because the intervention and investigation is based on suspicion that these 
parents do not care enough about their kids to protect them adequately. The ones who care 
about those kids, in the reporting scenario, are the neighbor who calls 911, or the authorities 
who intervene. But these same parents, accused of being so neglectful, are willing to make 
enormous sacrifices of their dignity, freedoms, and rights, in the hope of hanging onto these 
same kids that they are accused of caring so little about. 
 92 In 2000, the American Bar Association published a guide to representing parents in child 
welfare cases that advised attorneys to urge cooperation and to avoid confrontation: 
Although you must zealously represent the parent, experience shows that 
confrontational and obstructionist tactics often tend to be counterproductive to the 
parent’s interests. Since the agency and the court wield enormous and continuing 
power over the life of the child and, therefore, the parent, it benefits your client when 
you are selective in deciding which issues to contest. 
DIANE BOYD RAUBER & LISA A. GRANIK, REPRESENTING PARENTS IN CHILD WELFARE CASES 4 
(Mimi R. Laver ed., 2000). “[A] productive working relationship with the agency . . . may 
help . . . minimize needlessly contentious relationships between the parents and agency 
PIMENTEL38.1.1 (Do Not Delete) 11/4/2016  5:06 PM 
20 C ARD O Z O  L A W R E V IE W  [Vol. 38:1 
 
wrongdoing, (2) abject apologies, and (3) promises never to do it again. 
On that basis, the matter gets settled, and the parents, though shaken by 
the experience, are allowed to keep their children. After all, it is easier to 
persuade the authorities that this is not likely to happen again than to 
persuade them that there is nothing wrong with the judgment call the 
parent made, or that the parental judgment is within constitutionally-
protected bounds. As a result, the parents’ right to raise their children 
with a hands-off, long-leash parenting philosophy is never litigated, and 
it is very effectively chilled.93 Indeed, the parents in these cases can end 
up with a record of some kind, either a criminal record from their guilty 
plea to a child-neglect offense,94 or at least a listing on the state’s registry 
of child abusers, which can have huge consequences for these 
individuals’ employability in certain professions, and in child custody 
disputes that might arise in the future.95 At the same time, they have 
promised to abandon their free-range parenting practices, despite any 
beliefs they may have that long-leash parenting is what is best for their 
children. 
The impact is not limited to that family. Neighbors, onlookers, and 
anyone who has learned of the story in the media may be similarly 
intimidated, profoundly chilling the exercise of the parents’ 
constitutional rights. Parents learn from these incidents that they are 
 
caseworkers, and facilitate negotiated settlements that ensure the protection of the child 
without unnecessarily infringing on the family’s integrity.” Id.  
 93 Constitutional challenges may be overdue in other contexts where parental rights have 
been undervalued. Vivek Sankaran notes: 
[C]hild welfare systems continue to disregard the constitutional rights of 
nonoffending parents, individuals against whom the state has made no allegations 
and who thus have done nothing wrong other than to have a child in common with a 
parent who allegedly abused or neglected the child. These parents are presumed to be 
unfit based simply on their association with the other parent. 
Vivek S. Sankaran, Parens Patriae Run Amuck: The Child Welfare System’s Disregard for the 
Constitutional Rights of Non-Offending Parents, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 55, 57 (2009). “These systems 
are ripe for constitutional challenges.” Id. at 78. 
 94 See, e.g., Bridget Kevane, Guilty as Charged, BRAIN CHILD (Jan. 14, 2014), http://
www.brainchildmag.com/tag/bridget-kevane (describing the Bozeman, Montana case); infra 
text accompanying notes 111–12 (discussing the Jonesboro, Arkansas case). 
 95 See Lawrence, supra note 42 (discussing the serious impact of being listed on such 
registries). The stigma associated with such a listing may trigger procedural due process rights. 
Applying the “stigma plus” test, the reputational harm plus a legal disability that is caused by a 
government action, courts may find that a liberty interest was infringed, and that procedural 
due process must be afforded. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (public school 
students suspended for alleged misconduct, given the harm to the students’ reputation, may 
have suffered a loss of a liberty interest); see also Brandt v. Bd. of Coop. Educ. Servs., 820 F.2d 
41, 44–45 (2d Cir. 1987) (teacher accused of sexual misconduct with students suffers 
constitutionally cognizable harm because of the impact on his future job prospects); RICHARD 
HENRY SEAMON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: A CONTEXT AND PRACTICE CASEBOOK 435 (Michael 
Hunter Schwartz ed., 2013); James L. Buchwalter, Application of Stigma-Plus Due Process 
Claims to Education Context, 41 A.L.R. 6th 391 (2009). 
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not permitted to trust their own instincts in parenting their kids. They 
may feel like they have to keep their kids from playing outside, climbing 
trees, riding bikes in the neighborhood, walking to school, or a range of 
other activities—any activity that a busybody observer might deem 
inappropriate and report to authorities. 
Of course, the chilling of parental rights is a serious problem, but 
the circumstances of these cases are such that the cases almost always 
settle quickly without any adjudication of the parents’ rights. Because 
any attempt to dig in one’s heels and assert constitutional rights and 
prerogatives is only likely to delay or jeopardize the return of one’s 
children, it is not surprising that the parents’ rights in these cases have 
been overlooked. 
Moreover, to the extent that parents are waiving their 
constitutional rights in these cases, be they civil or criminal, it is not at 
all clear that the waivers are voluntary. In Vaughn v. Ruoff, a mildly 
retarded woman, whose two children were already in state custody, was 
coerced into a waiver of her rights in the decision whether to submit to 
tubal ligation.96 The social services worker was found to have violated 
her rights by promising her that she could get her two kids back if she 
agreed to the procedure: “A sterilization is compelled, not voluntary, if it 
is consented to under the coercive threat of losing one’s children, and 
hence unconstitutional.”97 It follows that Mr. Meitiv’s consent to a 
“safety plan” for his children, and the waiver of his parenting rights in 
that moment, may not have been voluntary, as it was coerced by the 
threat of removal of his children.98 
The result is a failure of constitutional checks and balances. If the 
executive branch is overreaching in these cases, it is the role of the 
judicial branch, unexercised whenever parents decline to assert their 
rights, to check the executive’s power to disrupt families in this way.99 
At the same time, courts can be overly deferential to the executive 
agencies.100 There may be potential for legislative intervention, as seen 
 
 96 Vaughn v. Ruoff, 253 F.3d 1124 (8th Cir. 2001). 
 97 Id. at 1130. The force of that promise—or the implied threat that refusal to submit to 
sterilization would keep her children from her—may be sufficient to render the consent 
involuntary. Id. at 1129 (“A jury could reasonably find that Ruoff’s comments about getting the 
two children back implied that the children would not be returned to the Vaughns if they did 
not agree to sterilization. A jury could properly conclude from such a finding that Margaret’s 
sterilization decision was not voluntary but rather was coerced, and this, we hold, implicates 
due process concerns.”). Nothing in the Vaughn decision suggests that the finding of coercion 
was based in any way on Vaughn’s limited mental capacity. The holding suggests that anyone 
would be coerced by the threat of taking one’s children away, or the promise of their return. Id. 
 98 St. George, supra note 1. 
 99 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177–78 (1803). 
 100 See, e.g., discussion infra Section V.D (discussing the hearings in removal cases). 
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recently with the passage of the Every Student Succeeds Act,101 signed 
into law on December 10, 2015, which included a provision that  
[N]othing in this Act shall . . . prohibit a child from traveling to and 
from school on foot or by car, bus, or bike when the parents of the 
child have given permission; or expose parents to civil or criminal 
charges for allowing their child to responsibly and safely travel to and 
from school by a means the parents believe is age appropriate.102  
This language was proposed by Senator Mike Lee of Utah, who made a 
point that he was pushing back against the legal trends discussed above: 
Our amendment protecting parents who allow their kids to walk to 
school is definitely a silver lining. Unsupervised moments are a huge 
part of how children learn, grow, and build the skills that prepare 
them for the rigors of citizenship and the adventure of adult life. 
America faces great challenges today. Kids walking to school with 
their parents’ permission is not one of them.103 
At the same time, however, the legislative branch is vulnerable to 
the popular hysteria/paranoia over child safety, and can be expected to 
respond to and validate the fears of their constituents. This is evident 
from the spate of new legislation criminalizing leaving kids in cars.104 
The statutes are, by and large, unnecessary, since it is already a crime to 
neglect or endanger a child in every state. More likely, these statutes are 
likely passed either (1) to pander to a public obsessed with child safety, 
or (2) merely to publicize and highlight the dangers of leaving kids in 
cars. The latter rationale raises the question of whether passing harsh 
criminal legislation is an appropriate means of conducting a public 
education campaign. But this is precisely the purpose of such legislation 
according to child safety advocate Janette Fennell: “The purpose of the 
laws is not to be the parent police. . . . What they’re really meant to do is 
to say, maybe you don’t know this is serious, but it is.”105 In either case, 
the legislative branch is not, for the most part, playing a meaningful role 
 
 101 Pub. L. No. 114-95, 129 Stat. 1802 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 6303b–7934 
(2015)). 
 102 FreeRangeKids.Com, President Obama Signs First Federal “Free-Range Kids” Legislation, 
PR NEWSWIRE (Dec. 10, 2015, 3:16 PM), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/president-
obama-signs-first-federal-free-range-kids-legislation-300191494.html. 
 103 Id. 
 104 As of August 2014, there were twenty states with laws addressing leaving a child in a 
parked car, most of them criminalizing the practice. Josh Harkinson, Where Is it a Crime to 
Leave a Kid Alone in a Parked Car?, MOTHER JONES (Aug. 7, 2014, 6:00 AM), http://
www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/08/parents-arrested-leaving-kids-alone-cars; State Laws, 
KIDSANDCARS.ORG, http://www.kidsandcars.org/resources/state-laws (last visited Aug. 2, 
2016). 
 105 A. Pawlowski, From Errand to Crime: Parents Now Face Hard Consequences for Leaving 
Kids in Car, TODAY (July 12, 2013, 8:03 AM), http://www.today.com/parents/errand-crime-
parents-now-face-hard-consequences-leaving-kids-car-6C10584642. 
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as a check on the executive in these cases; no one wants to run for re-
election having “voted against child safety” protections. 
In most jurisdictions, child protection agencies, police and 
prosecutors are unlikely to overreach, and meddle in the lives of parents 
who choose to give their kids a long leash. Many of the state actors are 
overwhelmed by their caseloads already, dealing with serious problems, 
kids who are coming to harm or facing genuine threats to their health 
and safety. But if, and whenever, these authorities decide to target a free-
range parent, or anyone else who fails to buy into the intensive 
parenting norms, the parents are likely to be intimidated, quickly cave, 
and let the state run roughshod over their parental rights and 
prerogatives. 
E.     The Best Interest of the Child Standard 
The jurisprudence of parents’ rights has been complicated 
somewhat by the occasional misapplication of the legal standard of the 
“best interest of the child.”106 This standard, which shows up in a variety 
of statutes, can be problematic because, if applied in a free-range 
parenting scenario, it marginalizes parental prerogatives, constitutional 
and otherwise, suggesting that the court, rather than the parent, can and 
should be the arbiter of what is best for a child.107 In Quilloin v. Walcott, 
the Supreme Court acknowledged the constitutional problem with 
applying the best interest of the child standard as a basis for infringing 
on parental rights: 
We have little doubt that the Due Process Clause would be offended 
“[i]f a State were to attempt to force the breakup of a natural family, 
over the objections of the parents and their children, without some 
showing of unfitness and for the sole reason that to do so was 
thought to be in the children’s best interest.”108 
 
 106 See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000); the case cited infra note 107. For a good 
discussion of how the standard has been applied see CHILDREN’S BUREAU, DETERMINING THE 
BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (2012). 
 107 It is reported, for example, that in the State of Washington, a 13-year-old was removed 
from his family and placed in foster care after the child complained that his parents made him 
go to church too often. The judge agreed that the parents’ church attendance requirements 
were excessive, and allowed the parents to recover custody of their son only after the parents 
agreed to less-frequent church attendance. ParentalRights.org, The Threat: Attacks on Parental 
Rights, http://www.parentalrights.org/index.asp?SEC=%7B81C1F260-4A9F-4013-8164-
68A360E295A5%7D (last visited July 13, 2015). 
 108 Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) (quoting Smith v. Org. of Foster Families, 
431 U.S. 816, 862–63 (1977) (Stewart, J., concurring)); see also Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 
657–58 (“The State’s interest in caring for Stanley’s children is de minimis if Stanley is shown to 
be a fit father.”). 
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For the most part, states narrowly limit its application by statute,109 
frequently suggesting that it is applicable only after parents are found to 
be unfit,110 but the concept seems to color the actions of state authorities 
in parenting situations. In Jonesboro, Arkansas, for example, a mother 
was arrested for child endangerment after making her fourth grader 
walk to school, in an effort to teach him a lesson after he had been 
suspended from the school bus for misbehavior on it (a fifth offense).111 
The arresting officer explained his decision to intervene: 
“You ask yourself the question, is that safe for the child?” said 
Jonesboro Police spokesman Sgt. Lyle Waterworth. 
“And if you wouldn’t want your child doing it, you probably don’t 
need some (other) child doing it.” 
“There were a number of things that could have happened to the 
child. The child could have been injured, abducted,” said Sgt. 
Waterworth.112 
The officer obviously thought that he was acting in the best interest 
of the child, and perhaps he was. But in so doing, he completely 
undermined the mother’s authority with the child, as well as 
 
 109 In Utah, for example, after a finding that a parent is “unfit,” the court may apply the best 
interest of the child standard to determine whether to terminate parental rights. UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 78A-6-503(12) (West 2016). The language of the statute otherwise emphasizes the 
importance, in terms of child welfare, of preserving the integrity of the family: 
(8) It is in the best interest and welfare of a child to be raised under the care and 
supervision of the child’s natural parents. A child’s need for a normal family life in a 
permanent home, and for positive, nurturing family relationships is usually best met 
by the child’s natural parents. Additionally, the integrity of the family unit and the 
right of parents to conceive and raise their children are constitutionally protected. 
* * * 
(12) Wherever possible family life should be strengthened and preserved, but if a 
parent is found, by reason of his conduct or condition, to be unfit or incompetent 
based upon any of the grounds for termination described in this part, the court shall 
then consider the welfare and best interest of the child of paramount importance in 
determining whether termination of parental rights shall be ordered. 
Id. § 78A-6-503(8), (12). 
 110 See, e.g., id.; see also Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68 (“[T]here is a presumption that fit parents act 
in the best interests of their children.”); infra text accompanying notes 120–22. However, courts 
have also struggled with the concept of “fitness,” which is undoubtedly a vague and subjective 
standard. See, e.g., Roe v. Conn, 417 F. Supp. 769, 780 (M.D. Ala. 1976) (striking down an 
Alabama state law stating, “When is a home an ‘unfit’ or ‘improper’ place for a child? 
Obviously, this is a question about which men and women of ordinary intelligence would 
greatly disagree. . . . Because these terms are too subjective . . . the statute is unconstitutionally 
vague.”). 
 111 Mother Who ‘Forced 10-Year-Old Son to Walk 5 Miles to School Faces Jail Time for 
Endangerment’, DAILY MAIL (Feb. 19, 2012, 12:54 PM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/
article-2103412/Mother-forced-10-year-old-son-walk-5-miles-school-faces-jail-time-
endangerment.html. 
 112 Id. 
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undermining the specific lesson the mother was attempting to teach 
him. 
The “best interest” standard is an appealing one at face value 
because children are viewed as innocent and vulnerable parties who 
cannot protect their own interests; it may seem obvious that the courts 
and the “system” should be looking out for the child. Indeed, the 
relevance and applicability of the standard is sometimes assumed, as 
reflected in the opening of a recent article in the Washington State Bar 
Association’s magazine: 
“Best interest of the child.” This is a standard familiar to many 
attorneys. It’s used in the application of a number of different 
laws . . . . Employment of this standard demonstrates the state’s 
concern for the most vulnerable members of society Decisions made 
in the child’s best interests often trump whatever rights may be held by 
adults, and rightly so.113 
The suggestion that this standard should be employed to trump 
“whatever rights may be held by adults” is presented as axiomatic.114 No 
defense or explanation is needed. 
But application of this standard, at least in situations where parents 
are in agreement on their parenting decisions,115 and not otherwise 
“unfit,” invites courts to disregard parental interests and rights, to 
second-guess parental determinations of what is best for their family 
and for their children, and to intervene, for the sake of children, 
whenever parental actions are not up to scratch.116 Moreover, the 
standard does little to constrain the judge, as Justice Stevens explained 
in his concurring opinion in Bellotti v. Baird, which dealt with a minor’s 
right to an abortion: 
[T]he only standard provided for the judge’s decision is the best 
interest of the minor. That standard provides little real guidance to 
the judge, and his decision must necessarily reflect personal and 
societal values and mores whose enforcement upon the minor—
particularly when contrary to her own informed and reasonable 
 
 113 Elizabeth Polay, Diane Wiscarson & James Gayton, Raising the Floor: Advocating for 
Special Education Services, NWLAWYER, Nov. 2015, at 13 (emphasis added). The article goes on 
to advocate the use of this standard in the provision of special education services. Id. 
 114 Id. 
 115 When parents separate from each other, and have differing visions of how their child 
should be raised—most commonly, who should have custody—it becomes impossible for the 
state (or the court) to defer to parental judgment. In those cases, the parents’ dispute must be 
settled by a court, and the court may properly invoke the “best interest of the child” in deciding 
between the parents’ separate and inconsistent visions for their child. See infra Section III.C.  
 116 GUGGENHEIM, supra note 24, at 40 (“The best interests standard necessarily invites the 
judge to rely on his or her own values and biases to decide the case in whatever way the judge 
thinks best. Even the most basic factors are left for the judge to figure out.”). 
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decision—is fundamentally at odds with privacy interests underlying 
the constitutional protection afforded to her decision.117 
If courts are going to second-guess parenting decisions based on a 
“best interest” standard, they will, in effect, be applying a de novo review 
of the parenting decision itself, and doing so with “little real 
guidance.”118 Their decisions similarly will “reflect personal . . . values 
and mores” that may be at odds with the interests underlying the 
constitutional protections parents should otherwise enjoy.119 
This is essentially what happened in the Supreme Court case of 
Troxel v. Granville, in which grandparents were seeking access to their 
grandchildren, despite the parent’s objections.120 The Washington State 
statute allowed “[a]ny person” seeking visitation rights to apply to the 
court “at any time,” and that the court could grant such visitation rights 
whenever “visitation may serve the best interest of the child,” and the 
first-instance court had granted such visitation to the grandparents.121 
The Supreme Court upheld the reversal of this decision, holding that 
this “breathtakingly broad” statute could not constitutionally be applied 
to second-guess the parents’ judgment on what is in their child’s best 
interest.122 
Of course, part of the problem with the “best interest” standard is 
the word “best.”123 If that were to become a legal standard for state 
interventions, then it doesn’t matter how good a parent’s parenting is, 
intervention could be justified anytime a “better” alternative is 
identified. The legal standard for judging and second-guessing parental 
choices—to justify state intervention—has to be articulated in terms of a 
minimum standard rather than an aspirational ideal. Even marginal 
parents are entitled to some deference; the state shouldn’t be able to 
intervene unless the parenting falls below minimum standards of 
adequacy. The concept of “best interest” is meaningful only after the 
prospect of entrusting the child to the parents is off the table. If the 
parents are splitting up, and custody of the child is in dispute, the court 
should settle the custody dispute in an effort to do what is best for the 
child. If the parents have been found to be unfit, the court must decide 
 
 117 Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 655–56 (1979). 
 118 Id. at 655; GUGGENHEIM, supra note 24, at 39–41. 
 119 Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 655; GUGGENHEIM, supra note 24, at 40–41 (“Painter demonstrates 
that unless judges are constrained by principles, they will always be unleashing an unfettered, 
uncontrollable power.”). See Pimentel, supra note 9, at 49 (“[I]t has been independently 
confirmed that women who are mothers are harder on other mothers who ‘have failed to 
protect their children.’” (quoting Ann T. Greeley, Women on the Jury: Stereotypes and Reality, 2 
ATLA Ann. Convention Reference Materials 2689 (2003))). 
 120 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000). 
 121 Id. at 67 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 26.10.160(3)). 
 122 Id. 
 123 Conversation with Barbara Glesner Fines (Jan. 8, 2016). 
PIMENTEL.38.1.1 (Do Not Delete) 11/4/2016  5:06 PM 
2016] P RO T E C T IN G  T H E  F RE E - RAN G E  K ID  27 
 
what to do with the child, in terms of custody and services; those 
decisions should be made in consideration of what is best for the child. 
But as long as there are fit parents on the scene, who agree on the 
parenting of their child, there should be no reason for the authorities to 
be considering the best interests of the child. The law presumes that fit 
parents act in the best interests of their child,124 and promotes the 
children’s interest most effectively by deferring to those parents. The 
concept was explained by the Supreme Court in Santosky: 
At the factfinding, the State cannot presume that a child and his 
parents are adversaries. After the State has established parental 
unfitness at that initial proceeding, the court may assume at the 
dispositional stage that the interests of the child and the natural 
parents do diverge. But until the State proves parental unfitness, the 
child and his parents share a vital interest in preventing erroneous 
termination of their natural relationship.125 
Not only are interventions, justified solely by the “best interest of 
the child,” constitutionally problematic, they also threaten to disrupt the 
family and to undermine parental authority. In so doing, ironically 
enough, these actions may cause considerable harm to children, and for 
a variety of reasons.126 First, the intervention itself is likely to upset the 
child’s sense of stability and security.127 It is undoubtedly terrifying for a 
child to see his or her parent placed under arrest, or threatened with 
arrest. Second, although parents are likely to make mistakes from time 
to time, the state is no less likely to make mistakes; the intervention 
itself—justified by what the state perceives to be “the best interest of the 
child”—may reflect the state’s own misjudgment of the situation. 
Indeed, there are compelling reasons to trust the parents’ judgment 
more than the states’ on issues of child welfare, as (a) the state lacks the 
intimate knowledge of this child’s particular personality, capabilities, 
and needs, and as (b) the state lacks the level of commitment a parent 
typically demonstrates to the happiness and well-being of his or her 
child.128 Finally, while there will no doubt be instances when state 
 
 124 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68 (“[T]here is a presumption that fit parents act in the best interests 
of their children.”). 
 125 Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 760 (1982) (citations omitted). 
 126 GUGGENHEIM, supra note 24, at 40–41 (discussing Painter v. Bannister, 140 N.W.2d 152 
(Iowa 1966), “This case brilliantly demonstrates what is unleashed when courts are free to 
decide a case based on the judge’s perception of a child’s best interests. . . . The case is described 
to show that one’s views of a child’s best interests are contingent upon the decisionmakers’ 
beliefs and values and that it is impossible to separate their views from those beliefs and 
values. . . . Painter demonstrates that unless judges are constrained by principles, they will 
always be unleashing an unfettered, uncontrollable power.”). 
 127 Doriane Lambelet Coleman, Storming the Castle to Save the Children: The Ironic Costs of 
a Child Welfare Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 413, 418–19 
(2005). 
 128 GUGGENHEIM, supra note 24, at 35–38. 
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intervention is necessary to protect children from serious neglect or 
abuse, a general policy of quick and early intervention will affect 
virtually every family—many that will suffer unjustified interventions, 
and the rest which will live in fear of such interventions.129 
The upshot is that an interventionist policy is not in the best 
interest of children, even if individual interventions could be justified on 
a “best interest” basis. Accordingly, legislatures, agencies, and courts 
must resist the temptation to resort to a simple appeal to the best 
interest of the child in justifying state intervention in the parent-child 
relationship. There is a proper time and place to apply this standard, as 
discussed infra, but courts and legislatures must be careful to limit its 
application otherwise, both as a matter of good public policy, and of 
respecting the constitutional rights of parents. 
II.     CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS FOR PARENTS’ RIGHTS 
The constitutional foundation for parents’ rights in these free-
range parenting cases follows from Rousseau’s social contract,130 
understanding the delineation between what government is designed to 
do (i.e., spheres of authority granted to the government, and those 
retained by the people).131 “[O]nly those rights individuals intend to 
submit to government authority are properly within that authority to 
regulate. John Locke developed similar ideas, arguing that many natural 
rights of men and women, including the parental power to raise 
children, are beyond government’s power to invade.”132 The Supreme 
Court has identified an array of these rights, retained by the people, 
worthy of particular protection because they are “implicit in the concept 
of ordered liberty”133 or “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and 
tradition.”134 These “fundamental rights and liberty interests” are 
entitled to “heightened protection against government interference,”135 
and include the “rights to marry, to have children, to direct the 
 
 129 Id. 
 130 Id. at 21 (“Since, according to Rousseau, this form of government depends on the 
consent of the governed, only those rights individuals intend to submit to government 
authority are properly within that authority to regulate.”). 
 131 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 438 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789) (quoting James Madison’s summary of 
an argument offered by Federalist defenders of the Constitution during the ratification debate: 
“[I]t follows, that all [powers] that are not granted by the Constitution are retained; that the 
Constitution is a bill of powers, the great residuum being the rights of the people.”). 
 132 GUGGENHEIM, supra note 24, at 21. 
 133 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). 
 134 Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion). 
 135 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997). 
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education and upbringing of one’s children, to marital privacy, to use 
contraception, to bodily integrity, and to abortion.”136 
A.     Strict Scrutiny Under the Fourteenth Amendment 
Absent a fundamental right, the state’s interference can be justified 
in terms of a “reasonable relation to a legitimate state interest,” but in 
the case of a fundamental liberty interest, it requires “complex balancing 
of competing interests in every case.”137 
Specifically, the state action is subject to “strict scrutiny,” meaning 
that the government must demonstrate (1) a compelling state interest in 
the action it is taking, and (2) that the action is narrowly tailored to 
serve that interest.138 Some cases have added the requirement that the 
state action must also be the “least restrictive alternative to advance the 
Government’s compelling interest.”139 This would be a formidable 
hurdle for the state to clear in the free-range parenting cases, if the state 
were called upon to defend its interventions in the family against such a 
demanding constitutional test. But for the reasons stated above, the 
state’s actions against parents are rarely subjected to this close 
examination, despite the fact that such actions seriously encroach upon 
the fundamental liberty interests of parents. 
The compelling state interest would likely be asserted as child 
safety, and it may seem obvious that protecting children from harm is 
sufficiently compelling. But in the free-range kid cases, the state should 
have to prove that the children are actually in danger when, for example, 
playing in the park without an adult present to supervise. That may be 
much more difficult to do, especially given the statistics that show that 
“stranger danger” incidents in the United States are statistically 
negligible.140 Some courts have glibly asserted the child safety 
justifications as self-evident, and declined to examine actual risks and 
dangers, such as a New Jersey court that concluded “we need not 
describe at any length the parade of horribles that could have attended 
[this] neglect,” denying the mother a hearing in which she had hoped to 
show that her children were not, in fact, in any significant danger for the 
few minutes she left them alone in the car.141 
 
 136 Id. at 720 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 137 Id. at 722. 
 138 City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 470, 470–72 (1989). 
 139 Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 181, 198 (3d Cir. 2008); see also Sable 
Commc’ns of Cal. v. F.C.C., 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989). 
 140 CAPLAN, supra note 8, at 102. 
 141 Dep’t of Children & Families, Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. E.D.-O, 82 A.3d 330, 
334 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2014), rev’d, 121 A.3d 832 (N.J. 2015). 
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Even more difficult to defend may be the heavy-handed approach 
sometimes taken by authorities when intervening in the family, as these 
are unlikely to be sufficiently “narrowly tailored” or the “least restrictive 
means” for protecting the children.142 
States must show both that (1) their actions further a compelling 
state interest and (2) they have chosen the least restrictive means to 
advance it or they are violating the Constitution. See City of Boerne v. 
Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 534 (1997) (“Requiring a State to demonstrate a 
compelling interest and show that it has adopted the least restrictive 
means of achieving that interest is the most demanding test known to 
constitutional law.”).143 
Arrests, confrontations with parents, threats of incarceration or of 
removal of the children, and condemnations in front of the children, 
seem to be difficult to justify, as such confrontations can do irreparable 
damage to parental authority and to children’s sense of security and 
stability.144 “Children . . . react even to temporary infringement of 
parental autonomy with anxiety, diminishing trust, loosening of 
emotional ties, or an increasing tendency to be out of control.”145 Taking 
custody of the children, and keeping them for hours—and causing them 
to miss dinner—before even notifying the parents, as was done in the 
Meitivs’ second encounter with the state,146 seems to be a particularly 
disproportionate response to the speculative danger of stranger 
abduction which presumably prompted the police action in the first 
place.147 And if the governing principle is the well-being of the children, 
the state would need to be rescuing the children from a genuinely grave 
 
 142 See Mukasey, 534 F.3d 181. In Mukasey child protection interests came into direct 
conflict with First Amendment rights, specifically in the context of access to pornography on 
the Internet. The Third Circuit applied strict scrutiny analysis, and held that even something as 
compelling as child protection could not justify state action that was not narrowly tailored, or 
the “least restrictive means” of pursuing the state interest: “In addition to failing the strict 
scrutiny test because it is not narrowly tailored, [the challenged law] does not employ the least 
restrictive alternative to advance the Government’s compelling interest in its purpose, the third 
prong of the three-prong strict scrutiny test.” Id. at 198. 
 143 GUGGENHEIM & SANKARAN, supra note 90, at 12–13. 
 144 See Coleman, supra note 127. 
 145 GUGGENHEIM, supra note 24, at 38 (quoting JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, ANNA FREUD & ALBERT 
SOLNIT, BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 25 (1979)). 
 146 Kelly Wallace, Maryland Family Under Investigation Again for Letting Kids Play in Park 
Alone, CNN (Apr. 24, 2015, 12:43 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/04/13/living/feat-maryland-
free-range-parenting-family-under-investigation-again (“Meitiv wrote, ‘The police coerced our 
children into the back of a patrol car, telling them they would drive them home. They kept the 
kids trapped there for three hours, without notifying us, before dropping them at the Crisis 
Center, and holding them there without dinner for another two and a half hours.’”).  
 147 “Children need and greatly benefit from a sense of security. That sense of security 
therefore deserves prominent protection.” GUGGENHEIM, supra note 24, at 37 (citing Ronald 
Dworkin, Liberal Community, 77 CAL. L. REV. 479, 487 (1989)). 
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situation for them to justify subjecting them to the harms that the 
intervention itself will inflict upon them. 
Enforcement of a state requirement that children be under the 
watchful eye of an adult every minute of the day would be overkill as 
well, not sufficiently narrowly tailored to survive strict scrutiny. Parents 
should be able to put an infant down for a nap and then turn their 
attention to other things, or grab a nap of their own,148 while the child 
sleeps. Parents of older kids should be allowed to give them windows of 
minimally-supervised or unsupervised play time, increasing with the age 
and maturity of the child.149 If the parents’ actions are genuinely 
creating unacceptable risks to a child, a least restrictive means of 
addressing that problem may be to offer educational opportunities to 
the parents on safety issues, to help the parents be more attentive to the 
dangers their child faces. Threats to arrest the parents or to take their 
children from them—actions that are deeply disruptive of the family, of 
parental and child security, and of family autonomy—are unlikely to be 
narrowly tailored or the least restrictive means for creating a safer 
environment for the child. 
 
 148 There have been recent incidents where parents have been arrested, when their child 
wanders off while the parents are asleep. E.g., Scott Powell, Mother Arrested for Sleeping While 
Her Three Year-Old Wanders the Streets, WTNH (Dec. 19, 2014, 9:32 PM), http://wtnh.com/
2014/12/19/mother-arrested-for-sleeping-while-her-three-year-old-wanders-the-streets 
(describing a mother charged with “risk of injury to a minor”); Terri Sanginiti, Mother Charged 
After Tot Wanders Off, DELAWARE ONLINE (June 21, 2011), https://web.archive.org/web/
20110701094051/http://www.delawareonline.com/article/20110621/NEWS01/106210351/
Mother-charged-after-tot-wanders-off (“A Glasgow woman who took a nap after putting her 3-
year-old daughter down for one was arrested on child endangerment charges after the child was 
found wandering around the neighborhood, police said.”); Dan Schrack, 3-Year-Old Child 
Wanders Route 5, While Mother Sleeps, WIVB (June 14, 2015, 8:24 AM), http://wivb.com/2015/
06/14/3-year-old-child-wanders-route-5-while-mother-sleeps (describing how a mother was 
arrested for endangering the welfare of a child). 
 149 JULIE LYTHCOTT HAIMS, supra note 38, at 153 (“If you feel the need to observe your kid 
playing . . . practice being at a greater distance than usual, and continually increase that 
distance as your child ages.”). 
[T]he systemic problem of overparenting is rooted in our worries about the world 
and about how our children will be successful in it without us. Still, we’re doing 
harm. For our kids’ sakes, and also for our own, we need to stop parenting from fear 
and bring a more healthy . . . approach back into our communities, schools, and 
homes. 
Id. at 8; see also Dorothy O’Keefe Diana, Helicopter Parents, It’s Up to You to Let Go Now as 
Your Teens Get Ready for High School, HUFFINGTON POST (July 7, 2016), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/dorothy-okeefe-diana/helicopter-parents-its-up-to-you-to-let-go-
now-as-your-teens-get-ready-for-high-school_b_7736806.html. 
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B.     What Is Included in Constitutionally-Protected Parents’ Rights? 
The rights of parents have been elaborated in a variety of disparate 
cases. In Moore v. City of East Cleveland, the Court considered the case 
of a grandmother, who lived with her son and two grandsons (who were 
not brothers but cousins to one other), convicted for a criminal 
violation of a housing ordinance that limited dwellings to a single 
family.150 The Court overturned the conviction, saying that the 
ordinance’s purposes—to reduce overcrowding, traffic congestion, and 
undue burdens on the local schools—were not sufficiently compelling to 
warrant “slicing [so] deeply into the family itself.”151 
Our decisions establish that the Constitution protects the sanctity of 
the family precisely because the institution of the family is deeply 
rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition. It is through the family 
that we inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished values, 
moral and cultural. 152 
Pierce v. Society of the Sisters, decided in 1925, involved attempts to 
enforce mandatory school attendance policies, against the parents’ 
preferences for an education more consistent with their own cultural 
and religious values.153 The law requiring students to attend public 
schools, as opposed to parochial schools, was struck down as 
“unreasonably interfer[ing] with the liberty of parents and guardians to 
direct the upbringing and education of children under their control,”154 
relying on Meyer v. Nebraska, another public education case decided 
just a couple of years earlier.155 
Almost fifty years later, in Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Supreme Court 
added, “The history and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong 
tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their 
children. This primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their 
children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American 
tradition.”156 As explained above, the Court went on to hold that an 
Amish family could not be compelled to send their daughter to high 
school,157 showing considerable cultural sensitivity in its analysis. 
 
 150 Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion). 
 151 Id. at 498. 
 152 Id. at 503–04. 
 153 Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
 154 Id. at 534–35. 
 155 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
 156 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972). For a more thorough discussion of the case 
see supra text accompanying notes 65–68. 
 157 In Yoder, however, the Court was careful to note that “[t]his case . . . is not one in which 
any harm to the physical or mental health of the child or to the public safety, peace, order, or 
welfare has been demonstrated or may be properly inferred,” distinguishing it from cases where 
the Court had upheld vaccination requirements and mandatory blood transfusions, over the 
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Enforcing intensive parenting norms leads down a road toward de 
facto prohibitions on large families,158 since no one can offer that level 
of supervision to so many children at once, or toward treating children 
as a luxury good, since low-income families cannot afford the level of 
intensive child care that would be required of them. The right to have 
children has been recognized as a fundamental human right,159 but if the 
legal system will punish parents who don’t, or can’t, provide intensive 
parenting to all their children, the system will effectively force people to 
curtail their family size, chilling the exercise of their fundamental right 
to procreate.160 
This outcome is not consistent with American core values, which 
celebrate and protect religious and cultural diversity, respecting the 
diverse traditions in our pluralistic society, through protecting parental 
autonomy.161 The assumption that there is only one correct way to 
parent, and that safety is of such importance that other cultural values 
must yield to the safety imperative, is a rather offensive form of cultural 
imperialism. 
Some of the Supreme Court’s strongest rhetoric about the 
constitutional rights of parents comes from the 2000 case of Troxel v. 
Granville, discussed above, in which grandparents were seeking 
visitation rights with their grandchildren, over the objection of the 
parent. The Court had no problem dismissing the grandparents’ claims, 
recognizing the parents’ fundamental rights over the “care, custody, and 
control of their children”162: 
 
objection of the parents. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 230. In free-range kid cases, the state will urge that 
the child faces physical harm from walking home from school or playing in the park because 
the child could be abducted. Parents in those cases will have to persuade the court that the risk 
of harm to the child is negligible; the evidence is overwhelmingly in favor of the parents on this 
point, but because people, including judges, seem to trust their own irrational fears more than 
the hard data, it may still be a hard sell. 
 158 Of course, limitations on family size have been widely condemned as a violation of 
fundamental human rights. “When China announced the end of its one-child policy [in 
October 2015], the general response . . . was positive, with many articles appropriately and 
unequivocally condemning the policy and praising its demise.” Jeremy Carl, China’s Children 
and Climate Change–The Left Is Against Them Both, NAT’L REV. (Nov. 2, 2015, 3:00 PM), 
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/426458/chinas-children-and-climate-change-left-
against-them-both-jeremy-carl. 
 159 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (procreation is “one of the basic civil 
rights of man”); see also Vaughn v. Ruoff, 253 F.3d 1124, 1129 (8th Cir. 2001) (“Sterilization 
results in the irreversible loss of one of a person’s most fundamental rights . . . . [Defendant]’s 
conduct violated [Plaintiff]’s Due Process Clause right to be free from coerced sterilization 
without appropriate procedures.”); supra text accompanying notes 96–97; cf. Buck v. Bell, 274 
U.S. 200 (1927) (upholding compulsory sterilization as constitutional in very limited 
circumstances). 
 160 The right to procreate has been recognized as “one of the basic civil rights of man.” 
Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541. 
 161 See discussion supra Section I.C. 
 162 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000); see also Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 
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The liberty interest at issue in this case—the interest of parents in the 
care, custody, and control of their children—is perhaps the oldest of 
the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court. More 
than 75 years ago, in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 401 
(1923), we held that the “liberty” protected by the Due Process 
Clause includes the right of parents to “establish a home and bring 
up children” and “to control the education of their own.” Two years 
later, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–535 (1925), we 
again held that the “liberty of parents and guardians” includes the 
right “to direct the upbringing and education of children under their 
control.” We explained in Pierce that “[t]he child is not the mere 
creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny 
have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare 
him for additional obligations.” Id. at 535. We returned to the subject 
in Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), and again confirmed 
that there is a constitutional dimension to the right of parents to 
direct the upbringing of their children. “It is cardinal with us that the 
custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, 
whose primary function and freedom include preparation for 
obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.” Id. at 166.163 
Following Troxel, state courts too have subjected infringements of 
parents’ rights over the “care, custody, and control of their children” to 
strict scrutiny.164 This has been held to prohibit state authorities from 
second-guessing parenting decisions simply because a state judge 
believes a better decision could have been made.165 
Against this backdrop, it seems clear that the parenting decisions of 
the Meitivs, and of other free-range parents, are entitled to strong 
constitutional protections.166 This is an example of parents who were 
 
702, 720 (1997) (“In a long line of cases, we have held that, in addition to the specific freedoms 
protected by the Bill of Rights, the ‘liberty’ specially protected by the Due Process Clause 
includes the rights to . . . direct the education and upbringing of one’s children . . . .”). 
 163 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65–66. 
 164 See, e.g., Dutkiewicz v. Dutkiewicz, 957 A.2d 821, 830 (Conn. 2008) (“[A] parent’s 
interest in the care, custody and control over his or her child is a fundamental right.”); see also 
Punsly v. Ho, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 139, 144–45 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (describing parents’ 
fundamental right to raise their children by stating “the custody, care and nurture of the child 
reside first in the parents” (citing Lulay v. Lulay, 193 Ill.2d 455, 474 (Ill. 2000))); Cent. Tex. 
Nudists v. Cty. of Travis, No. 03-00-00024-CV, 2000 WL 1784344, at *3 (Tex. App. Dec. 7, 
2000) (recognizing that parents have a general right, under the Fourteenth Amendment, to 
direct the upbringing of their children). 
 165 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 71. 
 166 The Second Circuit has gone further to suggest that the right of the family to stay 
together is shared not just by parents, but also by children. Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 
817, 825 (2d Cir. 1977) (“[T]he right of the family to remain together without the coercive 
interference of the awesome power of the state. . . . encompasses the reciprocal rights of both 
parent and children.”); see also Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 600 (2d Cir. 1999) 
(opining parents and children share a fundamental liberty interest to “remain together without 
the coercive interference of the awesome power of the state.”). 
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attempting to “prepare [their children] for additional obligations,”167 
and to “inculcate” them with values, including the values of 
responsibility and self-sufficiency.168 
III.     TENSIONS INHERENT IN THE RECOGNITION OF “RIGHTS” 
It is important to put the rights of parents in context. These are not 
rights that parents typically assert in a self-interested manner, as they 
are often exercised for the benefit of others: namely, their children. At 
the same time, parenting is a right and a privilege claimed by every 
species that raises their own young, and the joy and fulfillment that 
comes with raising a family, with seeing one’s children grow up and, 
hopefully, do well may be one of the most fundamental privileges of the 
human experience, unattainable in any other pursuit.169 Accordingly, 
the sanctity of the family and of the parent-child relationship is 
something that parents are unlikely to surrender lightly, even to state 
authorities who purport to be acting in the interest of those very same 
children. 
Under a Hohfeldian analysis, the parents’ rights might be 
characterized as an “immunity,” to the extent that it is a “freedom from 
the legal power or ‘control’ of another as regards some legal relation,” 
i.e., as regards the parent’s legal relation to her (or his) own child.170 
Non-parents cannot typically intervene or interfere with issues of child-
rearing, as that would be exercising control over the parent, interfering 
with that parent’s rights, or as Hohfeld might put it, that parent’s 
“immunity” from such control.171 But that characterization only 
highlights the fundamental problem in our characterization of parents’ 
rights: from whose control is the parent immune? 
Indeed, an archetypal framework for consideration of rights issues 
is the overlapping of one person’s rights with his neighbors: I enjoy 
freedom to exercise my rights, but that freedom is limited precisely by 
the need to respect your rights. The minute that the exercise of my rights 
interferes with the exercise of your rights, my rights have reached their 
logical and protectable limit.172 The limitation on a parent’s right might 
 
 167 Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sister, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925). 
 168 Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503–04 (1977). 
 169 See, e.g., Lawrence Rifkin, Is the Meaning of Your Life to Make Babies?, SCI. AM.: GUEST 
BLOG (Mar. 24, 2013), http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/guest-blog/is-the-meaning-of-your-
life-to-make-babies. 
 170 Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial 
Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 55 (1913). 
 171 Id. 
 172 See, e.g., G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, ¶ 29(2) (Dec. 10, 
1948) (“In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such 
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be viewed from a variety of perspectives, including (1) the rights of the 
child, (2) the rights of the state, and (3) the rights of the child’s other 
parent or legal caregiver. Each will be considered in turn. 
A.     Parents’ Rights v. Children’s Rights 
At the outset, it is tempting to consider the question of parental 
rights as limited by the rights of the children: that the parents’ rights 
come at the expense of children’s rights.173 For example, a farmer’s right 
to put his children to work in his fields and barns may be limited by the 
children’s right not to be exploited, as well as rights children enjoy 
under statutes barring child labor. A parent’s right to discipline the child 
is limited by the child’s right not to be abused, limiting the parent’s 
discretion to inflict severe physical punishments. 
Applying this concept to free-range parenting, the state justifies its 
interventions in the family, its second-guessing of parenting decisions, 
as necessary to protect the children from the dangers their parents are 
subjecting them to. The state, in other words, may be said to be acting to 
vindicate the rights of children, pushing back on the rights of the 
parents. 
The archetype—that parents’ rights come at the expense of 
children’s rights, and vice versa—may be misapplied when argued in the 
typical case of parent and child, particularly because the model is based 
on assumptions of self-serving by all parties. It is not, however, the 
norm of human experience that parents pursue only their own selfish 
interests when it comes to child-rearing; parenting is in large part an 
altruistic enterprise. When parent and child butt heads, as the parent of 
any teenager knows, it is usually the case of the parent insisting on 
something the parent perceives to be in the interest of the child, which 
conflicts with what the child perceives to be in his own interest. Both 
parties—parent and child—are trying to act in the interest of the child, 
and they simply disagree about how best to go about it. 
Because parents are responsible for, and typically committed to, the 
welfare of their children, it is only in the most exceptional case that a 
child would need protection from the parent. If the state presumed that 
parents’ interests inherently conflict with children’s interests, it would 
be natural for the state to assume the role of regulatory body, for the 
protection of the children. It is, perhaps, this mindset that has prompted 
the state to overreact to the parenting choices of free-range parents and 
 
limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and 
respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, 
public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.” (emphasis added)). 
 173 This is apparently what happened in British law. See MCCALL SMITH, supra note 25. 
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to others who, for cultural, religious, socio-economic, or other reasons, 
choose a less intensive parenting style. But it follows from a very curious 
assumption that the state somehow cares about the welfare of those 
children more than their own parents do. Anyone making such 
assumptions can hardly have known any parents. 
Rather, child welfare advocates, and state entities, should not 
assume that parental rights are somehow at cross-purposes with child 
welfare. For reasons that will be argued below, there are compelling 
reasons to believe that respecting parents’ rights and discretion in their 
parenting decisions—rather than monitoring them, second-guessing 
them, and intervening whenever a parental lapse is perceived—is the 
best way to protect child welfare, serving both the rights and the 
interests of children far more effectively. Indeed, this may be the most 
compelling policy reason that parents should enjoy constitutional 
protection for their parenting decisions. 
B.     Parents’ Rights v. State Parens Patriae Rights 
When the state does seek to intervene, it brings the state’s right into 
direct conflict with the parents’ right. The line-drawing question then 
becomes one of how extensive the parent’s right is, against the state’s 
competing interest to act on behalf of the child, and on behalf of society. 
Parens patriae is the state’s power to protect vulnerable citizens 
incapable of protecting themselves.174 There can be little question that 
the state has an important role to play here in cases of, for example, 
sexual abuse or severe physical abuse of children. If the parents cannot 
or do not protect the children from such abuse, and particularly if the 
parents are the ones inflicting the abuse, the state’s parens patriae power 
is appropriately invoked to intervene in the family for the protection of 
the children. 
The question arises, however, as to how far parens patriae power 
extends, especially as it applies to free-range parenting. What if there is 
no actual harm to the child, but only a risk of harm to the child? In such 
cases, when should the state be permitted, consistent with constitutional 
limits on state power, to second-guess the parents’ judgment on what is 
best for the child, and intervene in the parent-child relationship? As 
already noted, the state cannot constitutionally intervene in the family if 
the parents are fit; as the Supreme Court held in Stanley v. Illinois, “The 
State’s interest in caring for Stanley’s children is de minimis if Stanley is 
shown to be a fit father.”175 
 
 174 Parens Patriae, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (4th pocket ed. 2011). 
 175 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 657–58 (1972). 
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Those interventions dramatically undermine the family’s stability 
and the child’s sense of security, when the state takes children from their 
parents, or threatens to do so by launching an investigation.176 
Accordingly, as parents are already entrusted by nature, by moral duty, 
and by law, with the care and welfare of their children, the state’s 
intervention can be justified only by the most extreme dereliction of that 
parental duty. Otherwise, because such disruptive interventions are 
inherently harmful to children, the state abuses its parens patriae power 
to protect children when it intervenes in the parent-child relationship. 
The intervention comes at expense of parents’ constitutional rights, of 
course, as well: their fundamental liberty interests, as discussed above. 
C.     One Parent v. the Other Parent 
We also see parental rights discussed in the context of cases pitting 
the rights of one parent against another parent, or against someone who 
would play a parenting role.177 The typical parent v. parent case, 
however, addresses the simple matter of custody after the parents have 
parted ways. 
These cases are less problematic, in terms of the state’s 
overreaching and meddling in the family relationship, because the 
family itself is at a stalemate and needs, even invites, the state’s 
intervention. In this situation, the parents do not agree on what is best 
for the child.178 It is therefore entirely appropriate for the state to apply 
the “best interest of the child” standard to settle the matter. 
It makes sense in this type of dispute to apply the “best interest of 
the child” standard because the parental stalemate makes it impossible 
for the state to defer to the parents’ judgment. Indeed, it can be 
presumed that the parents are both trying to serve the child’s best 
interest,179 and because they disagree, the court needs to break the tie, 
applying the same standard that a parent would, i.e. what is best for the 
child. The disruption of the family and of the child’s sense of security is 
a fait accompli, carried out by the parents themselves with the 
 
 176 See Coleman, supra note 127. 
 177 The battle may not be just between parents, but parent v. step-parent, Quilloin v. 
Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978), or grandparent v. parent, Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000). 
 178 Of course, parents may not always be acting in the best interest of the child. They may 
want custody not because it would be good for the child, but because they vindictively wish to 
deprive the other parent of such custody, or any of a number of other selfish reasons. In such 
situations, it is the responsibility of the court to set aside such ignoble motives and act in a way 
that minimizes the harm the child is already suffering. In any case, the court is still basing its 
decision on what it perceives to be “the best interest of the child.” 
 179 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68 (“[T]here is a presumption that fit parents act in the best interests 
of their children.”). 
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dissolution of that family, so the state’s intervention is not causing the 
harm, just resolving the ongoing dispute. 
This scenario, therefore, is far different from those articulated 
above, where the state is insinuating itself into the family, trying to 
substitute its own child-rearing approach for what the parents have 
adopted and presumably agreed upon. The state’s perception of what is 
in the best interest of the child should be invoked to settle a dispute 
between the parents, but never to disrupt an intact family, with fit 
parents, where no such disagreement exists.180 
IV.     PARENTAL POWERS AND DUTIES 
A.     The Legal “Power” 
Given that the parents’ rights are not really about the interests of 
the parents, it may be helpful to consider more nuanced readings of 
“parental rights.” Alexandra Popovici argues that the parental interest is 
not so much a “right” as a “power.”181 She draws upon the work of 
Madeleine Cantin Cumyn, who has derived the concept of “The Legal 
Power” from the Civil Code of Québec, as something “distinct from the 
right,” rather a “prerogative granted in order to achieve a purpose.”182 
Popovici suggests that “[r]econceptualising the parent as a power 
holder, and not a right bearer helps in truly understanding the dynamics 
at play and in shifting the discussion to what really matters: the 
protection and empowerment of children.”183 
Rather than a right, “which the holder can use in his or her own 
interest,” Popovici argues that a parent has “a prerogative conferred in 
the interest of another.”184 This characterization of the issue invokes the 
 
 180 Quilloin, 434 U.S. 246, poses an interesting example here. In that case, the absentee 
natural father, who had never taken steps to legitimate his child, objected to the proposed 
adoption of the child, now eleven years old, by the stepfather. The key precedent was Stanley v. 
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, which had held that the state could not take custody of children over the 
objection of their unwed father, absent a finding that the father was unfit. But the Supreme 
Court distinguished Stanley, and allowed the adoption, even though it meant extinguishing the 
natural father’s parenting rights, relying on the best interest of the child in making that 
determination. The controlling factor in this case, however, appeared to be the preservation of 
an intact family (the family consisting of the mother and stepfather, who had enjoyed sole 
custody of the child the whole time the child was growing up), and the mother of the child 
favored the adoption. Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 254–55. 
 181 Alexandra Popovici, Children at Play: Parenthood Contextualized, Paper Presentation at 
the Law & Society Association Annual Meeting (May 29, 2015) (abstract on file with the 
author). 
 182 Madeleine Cantin Cumyn, The Legal Power, 17 EUR. REV. OF PRIV. L. 345 (2009). 
 183 Popovici, supra note 181. 
 184 Id. 
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concept of duty. The parent’s right over the rearing of her or his 
children cannot be considered without acknowledging, at the same time, 
the parent’s duty to the child. Therefore, applying the civil law concepts, 
the “best interest of the child” should not be invoked as a limitation on 
the parents’ rights, but rather as defining the duty of the parents in the 
exercise of the legal power over their children. 
B.     The “Duty” 
1.     Fiduciary Duty 
Another way to look at the parental role is as a fiduciary, again 
defining the duty of the parent to act in the best interest of the child. 
Lionel Smith has explored this concept in the context of Canadian 
common law, applying established principles of fiduciary duty to the 
parenting role.185 
Of course, fiduciary duties have been defined and conceptualized 
in a variety of ways, but if the fiduciary duty is defined as a duty of 
loyalty—a duty to act in the best interests of the beneficiary—Smith 
argues, it fits rather closely the legal expectations we have for parents. 
It is easier to imagine how this is a fiduciary duty if one thinks of 
the duty of the state when a child becomes a ward of the state. Certainly, 
the state has a duty to provide for the child—food, shelter, clothing, 
education, etc.—and to make these provisions in order to serve the 
child’s best interests. The state cannot be expected, however, to develop 
and maintain an affective bond with the child, even though parents 
almost universally do. As the Supreme Court explained in Parham v. 
J.R., 
[O]ur constitutional system long ago rejected any notion that a child 
is “the mere creature of the State” and, on the contrary, asserted that 
parents generally “have the right, coupled with the high duty, to 
recognize and prepare [their children] for additional 
obligations.” . . . The law’s concept of the family rests on a 
presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, 
experience, and capacity for judgment required for making life’s 
difficult decisions. More important, historically it has recognized that 
 
 185 The Canadian Supreme Court formally recognized a fiduciary duty on the part of parents 
in the case of M.(K.) v. M.(H.), 3 S.C.R. 6 (1992). In that case, a woman who had been sexually 
molested by her father all the years she was growing up, sued him in tort, alleging, among other 
things, a breach of fiduciary duty. Lionel Smith, Parents as Fiduciaries, Paper Presentation at 
the Law & Society Association Annual Meeting (May 29, 2015) (Professor Smith’s notes on file 
with author). 
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natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of 
their children.186 
This may be one of the most instructive aspects of Smith’s 
discussion of fiduciary duty, how parenting differs from the typical 
fiduciary relationship. The law may not be able to require a caregiver, 
parent or otherwise, to love a child, even though that may be what the 
child needs most. But parents typically do provide that, and a whole lot 
more than what they may be legally required to provide to their 
children. A fiduciary does not typically expend his own resources, 
depriving himself, for the benefit of the beneficiaries. And yet parents 
do that all the time. Indeed, parents typically provide far more to their 
children—(1) individual attention, (2) love (including manifestations of 
that love through quality time, hugs, etc.), (3) a sense of security, 
belonging, and self-esteem as a valued member of the household, etc.—
than the law does, or could ever, require. And that is all the more reason 
to entrust children’s welfare to the parents rather than to the state, in 
situations where the state might otherwise try to intervene. 
2.     The Business Judgment Rule 
The other useful concept in the law of fiduciaries, as applied to the 
parent-child relationship, is the “business judgment rule.” Corporate 
directors have a fiduciary relationship toward the corporation and its 
stockholders, but directors have to be protected from liability for their 
good faith actions. The business judgment rule creates a strong 
presumption in favor of the directors, insulating them from liability for 
decisions that ultimately harm the corporation. The presumption is that 
“in making business decisions not involving direct self-interest or self-
dealing, corporate directors act on an informed basis, in good faith, and 
in the honest belief that their actions are in the corporation’s best 
interest.”187 It ensures that a court “will not substitute its own notions of 
what is or is not sound business judgment,”188 except in the absence of 
such informed good faith.189 
 
 186 Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (emphasis added). 
 187 Business-Judgment Rule, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (4th pocket ed. 2011); Sinclair Oil 
Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971). 
 188 Sinclair, 280 A.2d at 720. 
 189 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), rev’d, Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 
(Del. 2000). 
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3.     Application to Parents 
The application to parents is obvious and compelling. If we 
characterize parents as fiduciaries, we afford them a strong presumption 
in favor of their parenting decisions. We ensure that no court or other 
regulatory body will “substitute its own notions of what is or is not 
sound [parenting] judgment,”190 as long as parents are reasonably 
“informed,” acting in “good faith and in the honest belief” that their 
action was in the best interest of the child.191 Indeed, the Supreme Court 
reaffirmed, in Troxel v. Granville, that “there is a presumption that fit 
parents act in the best interests of their children.”192 
Unfortunately, it appears that parents are not always being 
afforded this type of presumption, as CPS workers, police officers, 
prosecutors, and courts appear to have no qualms about substituting 
their own notions of what constitutes good parenting for that of the 
parents themselves, and make no particular effort to demonstrate 
parental bad faith in these cases. Certainly free-range parents like the 
Meitivs could never have been implicated for child neglect if they had 
enjoyed such a presumption under the law. 
4.     Issues of Risk 
One of the key rationales for the business judgment rule is that if 
corporate directors faced liability for losses of the corporation, they 
would never dare take any risks, and that shareholders would suffer from 
the overly conservative approach directors would be compelled to 
adopt.193 But that is precisely what parents are forced to do now, to take 
an absurdly conservative approach to parenting—where virtually no risk 
to the child is considered acceptable194—and the children suffer. 
 
 190 Sinclair, 280 A.2d at 720. 
 191 See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812. 
 192 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68 (2000). 
 193 Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1052 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
 194 Compelling examples of this are easy to find, as parents are charged with crimes for 
letting children play in the park, or for leaving their children in the car for a few minutes while 
they dash into a store to pay for gas, etc. Childhood injuries and deaths from being left in cars 
have attracted a lot of attention, and the advice to parents is never to leave a child in a car “not 
even for a minute!” Jan Null, Heatstroke Deaths of Children in Vehicles, NOHEATSTROKE.ORG 
(Sept. 9, 2016), http://noheatstroke.org. This is even though the risk of harm for leaving a child 
in a car for such a short time—especially when the climate control system of the car is left 
running—is essentially zero. See John N. Booth III et al., Hyperthermia Deaths Among Children 
in Parked Vehicles: An Analysis of 231 Fatalities in the United States, 1999–2007, 6 FORENSIC 
SCI., MED., & PATHOLOGY 99 (2010) (documenting that the harm to children typically comes in 
situations where the children are left in the car for hours). The “not even for a minute” advice 
undoubtedly comes from the fact that over half of the deaths come from situations where the 
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Surely parenting is as difficult, and as fraught with risk, as the 
business world, and the overprotection of children has been widely 
documented as harmful to them, just as overly cautious business 
strategy is bad for shareholders.195 Parents, unlike corporate directors, 
are already hard-wired to be protective of their children, so the threat of 
legal liability seems unnecessary to provide parental incentives to take 
care. But fear of legal liability may impair parental judgment—it 
undoubtedly does, now that cases like the Meitivs’ are getting 
publicity—to the detriment of the families themselves. 
Our legal system recognizes that directing a corporation is an 
exercise in risk management, and that the health and profitability of the 
American corporation requires that directors be free to make such risk 
management decisions without fear of liability. Parenting too is an 
exercise in risk management, as protecting a child from one risk, almost 
inevitably subjects him or her to another risk.196 It is a curious thing 
indeed if the law is more solicitous of the health and interests of the 
corporation, and of its shareholders, than it is of the health and interests 
of the American family, and its youngest and most vulnerable members. 
One might quibble with the analogy, as children and corporations 
are hardly equivalent.197 Nonetheless, it is neither wise nor rational to let 
remote risks dominate decision-making, particularly when the price of 
precaution outweighs its expected value. Tort law requires persons to 
 
child was forgotten in the vehicle; if you don’t leave your child in a car for even a minute, the 
child cannot be forgotten there. Id. The prosecutions of parents, however, have often involved 
parents who have not forgotten about the children, and who have left the car’s climate control 
system engaged, and in which the child did not come to harm. Erring on the side of caution 
may be good safety advice, but our society has begun to treat a parent’s failure to exercise such 
an abundance of caution as a criminal offense. 
 195 Pimentel, Criminal Child Neglect, supra note 9, at 958–59. 
 196 Id. at 961–62. 
 197 Of course, the well-being of children is not perfectly analogous to the health of a 
corporation. Failure of a commercial enterprise, unlike the loss of a child, might be deemed a 
necessary loss, even a good thing, for the health of the industry and the economy overall. 
Investors, unlike children, have voluntarily chosen to assume such risks. Moreover, investors 
can diversify their portfolios to hedge against the failure of a corporate strategy, a risk taken 
that turns out badly. While some investments fail, others may more than compensate, resulting 
in positive portfolio growth overall, arguably greater than if every company were managed 
conservatively. It is hard to look at children this way, and no one would argue that the success 
of one child could compensate for the loss of another. In earlier eras, when infant mortality was 
commonplace and childhood diseases routinely claimed the lives of their victims, things may 
have been different. But even if having a larger family mitigated the tragedy somewhat in those 
days—so the “portfolio” would be doing well, despite the loss of one of the children—it can 
never be easy to rationalize that loss. And to the extent that was ever true, it is not so today, as 
families are smaller, and the few children born into modern families are perceived to be all the 
more precious. HONORÉ, supra note 41, at 243 (“The fewer kids you have, the more precious 
they become and the more risk-averse you get.” (quoting DAVID ANDEREGG, WORRIED ALL THE 
TIME: REDISCOVERING THE JOY IN PARENTHOOD IN AN AGE OF ANXIETY (2001))); see also 
MARGARET K. NELSON, PARENTING OUT OF CONTROL: ANXIOUS PARENTS IN UNCERTAIN TIMES 
17, 23 (2010) (referencing the “preciousness” effect). 
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behave reasonably in the taking of precautions, and will not find 
negligence unless the likelihood times the gravity of the harm is greater 
than the cost of avoiding it.198 Once we acknowledge that parenting is 
inherently an exercise in risk management, we need to offer some 
protection for the parents who make those judgment calls. Arguing that 
the standards for risk avoidance should be high does not change the fact 
that almost every parenting decision is an exercise in risk-management, 
a decision where reasonable minds may differ. And unlike corporate 
directors, it appears that parents—who, after all, are doing their best 
without the benefit of professional training or expertise—are not getting 
the benefit of the doubt, or the deference they need and deserve, in the 
tough risk management decisions that they make on a daily, even 
hourly, basis.199 
V.     THE IMPORTANCE OF PARENTS’ PROCEDURAL RIGHTS 
Given that the Supreme Court has already opined on the rights of 
parents for the care and custody of their children, and recognized the 
fundamental liberty interest at stake, the problem for parents caught up 
in these cases may lie not so much in their substantive rights as in the 
procedures that are failing to protect those substantive rights. “On 
numerous occasions, the Court has described the deprivation in child 
protective cases as a ‘unique kind of deprivation,’ implicated by even a 
temporary dislocation of a child from his or her parent’s custody. This 
deprivation warrants heightened procedural protections not typically 
applicable in civil proceedings.”200 Protecting these procedural rights 
poses legal and logistical challenges, however. 
A.     Right to Counsel 
1.     Right to Counsel Under the Fourteenth Amendment 
First, parents do not enjoy a constitutional guarantee of counsel in 
these cases. In a 5-4 decision in Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 
 
 198 This was the holding, of course, of the venerable Learned Hand decision in United States 
v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). 
 199 See the discussion of parenting as risk management in Pimentel, Criminal Child Neglect, 
supra note 9, at 961–63; see also Brooks, supra note 55 (“I’ve been doing every minute of every 
day since having children, a constant, never-ending risk-benefit analysis.”). 
 200 Sankaran, supra note 93, at 68 (citing M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 127–28 (1996)). “In 
M.L.B. v. S.L.J., the Court concluded that due process required courts to furnish indigent 
litigants trial court transcripts, free of cost, when appealing termination of parental rights 
decisions.” Id. (citations omitted). 
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the Supreme Court found no such right under the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Sixth Amendment (unless they are 
also charged with a crime, in which case the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel applies), or, apparently, any other provision of the 
Constitution.201 
Of particular interest, however, are the dissents in Lassiter. Justice 
Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, felt it was 
fundamentally unfair to not afford an indigent defendant the right to an 
attorney in a termination preceding, given that “[t]he State’s ability to 
assemble its case almost inevitably dwarfs the parents’ ability to mount a 
defense.”202 To illustrate this disparity, Justice Blackmun quoted trial 
excerpts that painfully depicted the pro se parent’s inability to represent 
herself.203 “The court gave petitioner an opportunity to cross-examine 
[a] social worker, but she apparently did not understand that cross-
examination required questioning rather than declarative statements. At 
this point, the judge became noticeably impatient . . . .”204 The state then 
introduced prejudicial hearsay evidence, to which the “[p]etitioner 
made no objection.”205 When the judge asked the petitioner if she had 
any closing arguments, she responded merely: “Yes. I don’t think it’s 
right.”206 Thereafter the trial court ordered the termination of her 
parental rights.207 The fundamental unfairness of such proceedings, 
coupled with the unique importance of parental rights, persuaded the 
 
 201 Lassiter v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 33 (1981). Outside the criminal context, the 
Supreme Court has used the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to make the 
determination if appointed counsel is constitutionally required. Specifically, the court will use 
the Mathews v. Eldridge test balancing (1) the nature of the private interest, (2) the risk of 
erroneous deprivation of the private interest without the requested procedure, and (3) the 
government’s interest. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
 202 Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 763 (1982). In this case, the Supreme Court went 
detailed listing the advantages the state has in parental termination proceedings. Specifically, 
the Court stated that there are: 
[n]o predetermined limits restrict[ing] the sums an agency may spend in prosecuting 
a given termination proceeding. The State’s attorney usually will be expert on the 
issues contested and the procedures employed at the factfinding hearing, and enjoys 
full access to all public records concerning the family. The State may call on experts 
in family relations, psychology, and medicine to bolster its case. Furthermore, the 
primary witnesses at the hearing will be the agency’s own professional caseworkers 
whom the State has empowered both to investigate the family situation and to testify 
against the parents. Indeed, because the child is already in agency custody, the State 
even has the power to shape the historical events that form the basis for termination. 
Id. 
 203 Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 54–55, n.22 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 204 Id. at 54.  
 205 Id. at 53. 
 206 Id. at 56. In addition, when the petitioner’s mother, an important witness, took the stand, 
“[p]etitioner was not told that she could question her mother, and did not do so.” Id. at 55. 
 207 Id. at 19 (majority opinion). 
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four dissenting justices that parental rights could not be constitutionally 
extinguished without right to counsel.208 
In his separate dissent, Justice Stevens agreed with the other 
dissenters, but stated he would take his reasoning “one further step,” to 
equate the parents’ rights in these cases to those of criminal 
defendants.209 
The state may incarcerate [a person] for a fixed term and also may 
permanently deprive [that person] of her freedom to associate with 
her child. . . . Although both deprivations are serious, often the 
deprivation of parental rights will be the more grievous of the two. The 
plain language of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that both 
deprivations must be accompanied by due process of law.210 
Justice Stevens’ suggestion that parental rights deprivations are 
more serious than criminal incarcerations had been articulated a few 
years earlier in the House of Representatives in the context of the Indian 
Child Welfare Act, as the House committee report observed: “The 
removal of a child from the parents is a penalty as great, if not greater, 
than a criminal penalty.”211 Consistent with this, Justice Stevens 
concluded that, for the same reasons criminal defendants have a right to 
appointed counsel, parents facing termination should have the same 
right: 
In my opinion the reasons supporting the conclusion that the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment entitles the defendant 
in a criminal case to representation by counsel apply with equal force 
to a case of this kind. The issue is one of fundamental fairness, not of 
weighing the pecuniary costs against the societal benefits. 
Accordingly, even if the costs to the State were not relatively 
insignificant but rather were just as great as the costs of providing 
prosecutors, judges, and defense counsel to ensure the fairness of 
criminal proceedings, I would reach the same result in this category 
of cases. For the value of protecting our liberty from deprivation by 
the State without due process of law is priceless.212 
The history of the application of the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel in criminal cases is instructive. In 1938, the Supreme Court held 
the Sixth Amendment required the federal government to afford 
indigent federal defendants appointed counsel.213 Twenty-five years 
later, in Gideon v. Wainwright, this Sixth Amendment requirement was 
 
 208 Id. at 35–60 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 209 Id. at 59–60 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 210 Id. at 59 (emphasis added). 
 211 H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386, at 22 (1978), cited in Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 39 (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting). 
 212 Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 59–60 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 213 See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). 
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applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.214 The 
Supreme Court reasoned that “any person haled into court, who is too 
poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is 
provided for him,” citing specifically the typical defendant’s lack of 
knowledge of the law and the vast sums of money and resources the 
government has at its disposal to convict him.215 These are precisely the 
concerns motivating the dissenters in Lassiter, and if being deprived of 
one’s children is “more grievous” than a criminal penalty, the right to 
counsel in such cases is every bit as compelling as it is for criminal 
defendants.216 
2.     Right to Counsel Under State Constitutions and Statutes 
Nevertheless, many, but not all, states have statutes or case law 
affording a right to counsel in state-initiated termination-of-parental-
rights proceedings. Some of the states appear to have been inspired 
directly by the dissents in Lassiter. 
Although the 5-4 Lassiter majority did not recognize a categorical 
Fourteenth Amendment right to counsel in these cases, the force of the 
dissents has had great impact in various states.217 Many states have 
enacted statutes that provide counsel for parents in these proceedings.218 
A number of state courts have recognized it as a right notwithstanding 
the Supreme Court’s holding in Lassiter.219 The Alaska Supreme Court, 
for example, interpreting its own state constitution, stated explicitly: 
“[W]e reject the case-by-case approach set out by the Supreme Court in 
Lassiter. Rather, our view comports more with the dissent.”220 Other 
state courts have also pushed back against the Lassiter majority opinion, 
including Connecticut,221 Louisiana,222 North Carolina,223 and 
Pennsylvania.224 
 
 214 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 215 Id. at 344. 
 216 Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 59 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 40 (“Surely there can be few losses 
more grievous than the abrogation of parental rights.”) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 217 Clare Pastore, Life After Lassiter: An Overview of State-Court Right-to-Counsel Decisions, 
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y, July–Aug. 2006, at 186, http://
civilrighttocounsel.org/uploaded_files/37/Life_after_Lassiter__Pastore_.pdf. 
 218 Laura K. Abel & Max Rettig, State Statues Providing for a Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y, July–Aug. 2006, at 245, http://
www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/d/download_file_39169.pdf. 
 219 Pastore, supra note 217, at 188–89. 
 220 In re K.L.J., 813 P.2d 276, 282 n.6 (Alaska 1991); Pastore, supra note 217, at 188–89. 
 221 Lavertue v. Niman, 493 A.2d 213, 219 (Conn. 1985) (citing Corra v. Coll, 451 A.2d 480 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1982)); see Pastore, supra note 217, at 188–89. 
 222 Louisiana ex rel. Johnson, 465 So. 2d 134, 138–39 (La. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that 
constitutional due process mandated appointment of counsel for indigent parents in 
termination proceedings); see Pastore, supra note 217, at 188. 
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However, Justice Stevens’ reasoning extends beyond the context of 
the parental termination proceedings themselves. In criminal cases, 
individuals are entitled to attorneys before their trial begins, before they 
are even charged, as soon as their first custodial interrogation begins.225 
Miranda v. Arizona highlighted and addressed the problem of criminal 
defendants’ rights to counsel being denied to them at this early stage, 
and demanded both that defendants be informed of their rights to 
counsel, and that questioning cease the moment the individual demands 
an attorney.226 Absent counsel at this stage in the proceedings, the 
defendant is likely to waive his rights unwittingly, including his Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination.227 
The abuse of parents’ rights by CPS caseworkers cannot be nearly 
as widespread as the constitutional violations by law enforcement that 
underlay the Miranda decision. Nonetheless, the cases cited and 
discussed above suggest tremendous potential to trample the rights of 
parents in these cases, where parents’ child-rearing decisions are being 
second-guessed. Mr. Meitiv’s attempt to invoke a right to counsel 
prompted a threat to take his children away: 
[A] CPS worker required [Mr. Meitiv] to sign a safety plan pledging 
he would not leave his children unsupervised until the following 
Monday, when CPS would follow up. At first he refused, saying he 
needed to talk to a lawyer, his wife said, but changed his mind when 
he was told his children would be removed if he did not comply.228 
Faced with such a threat, the waiver of the right to counsel, much 
less the right to the “care, custody, and control” of his children,229 
cannot be fairly deemed voluntary.230 
No doubt Miranda changed the nature of police investigations, and 
fundamentally altered the way police approach their work.231 A right to 
counsel for parents facing any investigation that could result in their 
being deprived of their children could play a powerful role in 
transforming the way CPS workers and other law enforcement approach 
 
 223 McBride v. McBride, 431 S.E.2d 14, 18 (N.C. 1993) (questioning the appropriateness of 
Lassiter’s framework for all right-to-counsel determinations); see Pastore, supra note 217, at 
189. 
 224 Coll, 451 A.2d at 487 (finding a putative father entitled to counsel in a paternity action); 
see Pastore, supra note 217, at 188. 
 225 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 226 Id. 
 227 Id. 
 228 St. George, supra note 1. 
 229 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000). 
 230 See discussion of Vaughn, supra text accompanying notes 96–97. 
 231 Brooks Holland, Miranda v. Arizona: 50 Years of Judges Regulating Police Interrogation, 
16 INSIGHTS ON L. & SOC’Y 1 (2015); cf. George C. Thomas III & Richard A. Leo, The Effects of 
Miranda v. Arizona: “Embedded” in Our National Culture?, 29 CRIME & JUST. 203 (2002). 
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such families and their investigation of them. If the authorities are 
required to advise parents of their rights, for example, they are far less 
likely to overlook or disregard those rights. Richard Leo, a critic of 
Miranda and a skeptic of its impact,232 conceded: “Although they may 
have devised clever strategies for successfully negotiating Miranda 
waivers and thereafter eliciting statements, American police . . . have, by 
necessity, become more solicitous of suspects’ rights, more respectful of 
their dignity, and more concerned with their welfare inside the 
interrogation room.”233 
Rights to counsel, and a requirement to advise parents of their 
right to counsel, are likely to have a similar salutary effect on the CPS 
caseworkers’ respect for parental rights. At the same time, if they know 
that their investigative approach is likely to be questioned and 
challenged by an attorney—rather than just the clueless and intimidated 
parents—they may be more cautious in how they proceed, and be more 
respectful of parents’ legitimate claims to the care and custody of their 
children. 
Although it is unlikely the Supreme Court would issue another 
decision like Miranda in this area, particularly given the majority 
holding in Lassiter, states can create a similar right to counsel, and the 
right to be informed of these rights, at these initial stages. Indeed, a 
number of state courts have embraced the reasoning in the Lassiter 
dissents, and they have found in their state constitutions some 
protection of a parent’s right to counsel.234 And many states have 
afforded such right to counsel by statute, although only in the context of 
termination proceedings.235 The state-level developments present a 
promising precedent, and suggest a platform for affording further 
protection and more meaningful enforcement of parental rights. 
B.     Effective Representation 
Some parents caught up in this process are also charged with 
criminal child neglect or endangerment.236 If so, they are entitled to an 
attorney under the Sixth Amendment who may help them navigate 
through the system. But whether they hire their own counsel, or get the 
 
 232 See Leo & Thomas, supra note 231. 
 233 Richard A. Leo, The Impact of Miranda Revisited, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 621, 670 
(1996) (emphasis added). 
 234 Pastore, supra note 217, at 188–89. 
 235 Abel & Rettig, supra note 218. 
 236 Although the Meitivs were never charged with a crime, Shanesha Taylor and Debra 
Harrell were. See Friedersdorf, supra note 11; Grinberg, supra note 14 (citing also the arrest of 
Nicole Gainey “after police found her 7-year-old son alone in a park less than a mile from her 
home.”).  
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benefit of court-appointed counsel, they are likely to end up with an 
attorney who has expertise in criminal law, but who may be poorly 
qualified to navigate the procedure of the child protection agency.237 
Indeed, the criminal lawyer is likely to advise her client not to cooperate 
with authorities, at least not at first—a generally accepted strategy for 
criminal defendants238—when, arguably, this is exactly the opposite of 
what should happen with the agency if the parent hopes to retain 
custody of his or her children.239 
There are dangerous pitfalls to trusting the advice of a criminal 
lawyer when compelling rights are at stake in other areas of law. In 
Padilla v. Kentucky, a criminal lawyer advised an immigrant (a lawful 
forty-year resident of the United States) to plead guilty to a drug-
distribution charge, assuring him, erroneously, that the resulting 
conviction would not provide a basis for the defendant’s deportation.240 
The Court allowed withdrawal of the guilty plea, noting that although 
the deportation consequence was collateral, the client’s interest in 
avoiding deportation was so great that the “affirmative misadvice” 
amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth 
Amendment: “[We] have previously recognized that ‘[p]reserving the 
client’s right to remain in the United States may be more important to 
the client than any potential jail sentence.’”241 It is easy to imagine 
criminal defense lawyer’s advice, notwithstanding its soundness in 
terms of criminal law strategy, leading to bad outcomes in the 
dependency or termination proceedings against the parents. Padilla 
suggests that such outcomes may amount to a Sixth Amendment 
violation. 
Parents clearly need counsel, but not just any counsel. They need 
counsel who know what they are doing in child protection cases. 
Unfortunately, in states that provide counsel to parents under their 
various statutory schemes, the attorneys may lack the qualifications and 
experience to provide quality representation,242 particularly in this 
 
 237 Barbara Glesner Fines, Almost Pro Bono: Judicial Appointments of Attorneys in Juvenile 
and Child Dependency Actions, 72 UMKC L. REV. 337, 340 (2003). 
 238 See, e.g., James Duane, Don’t Talk to Police, YOUTUBE (June 21, 2008), https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=6wXkI4t7nuc; James Kirk Piccione, Top Ten Reasons Why You 
Should Not Talk to the Police, LAW OFFICES JAMES KIRK PICCIONE, http://
www.kirkpiccione.com/10-reasons-not-talk-police (last visited Mar. 1, 2016). 
 239 See RAUBER & GRANIK, supra note 92, at 4–5; supra text accompanying note 91 
(describing how immediate and full cooperation with the authorities is recommended as the 
best strategy for keeping custody of one’s children in these cases). 
 240 Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010). Given the Court has also stated parental rights 
are as serious as criminal incarceration, discussed supra, it would seem that the reasoning could 
be extended to parental rights, under similar circumstances of Padilla. 
 241 Id. at 368 (citing INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001)). 
 242 Fines, supra note 237, at 345 (referring to panels of attorneys who take appointment to 
represent indigent clients in civil proceedings, “attorneys participating in these panels are often 
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specialized and sensitive area. Protection of parents’ rights, which 
requires building the confidence of state authorities that the parents can 
be trusted with their own children, requires that attorneys play 
meaningful intermediary roles on behalf of parents: asserting the 
parents’ rights without alienating the agency. It is a tall order, but 
attorneys who develop expertise in the area have an opportunity to build 
reputations and goodwill with the courts and with the agencies; such 
attorneys are critical to the protection of parents’ rights in these 
proceedings. 
Barbara Glesner Fines explores alternative methods for providing 
such counsel in her article Almost Pro Bono: Judicial Appointments of 
Attorneys in Juvenile and Child Dependency Actions, with particular 
emphasis on the method of the court’s appointing counsel, but allowing 
the counsel to “buy out” of the obligation by hiring another attorney to 
take the case, thereby fulfilling their court-appointed representation 
obligation through delegation.243 The “buy-out” option enables 
attorneys to specialize in this area, and allows large firms to retain and 
maintain well-qualified and well-resourced specialists in this area on 
their own staffs, for the purpose of taking the cases whenever one of the 
firm’s other attorneys is appointed to represent indigent parents in a 
case involving alleged neglect or abuse.244 
A variety of other approaches have been adopted in the various 
states, with varying degrees of success.245 The important thing, in terms 
of protecting the rights of parents, is that such parents have counsel who 
are sufficiently experienced and knowledgeable to provide effective 
representation and, as discussed below, that they have such counsel at 
the critical stages of the proceedings. 
C.     Appointment of Counsel at a Sufficiently Early Stage 
Indeed, it is critical that parents have this representation early 
enough in the investigation to be able to preserve and protect those 
rights. As demonstrated above, parents may feel the need to waive their 
rights in order to persuade the authorities not to take their children 
from them.246 Introducing counsel into this scenario may do little to 
resolve the problems or defend the rights of parents if the parents have 
 
inexperienced, new attorneys seeking experience and opportunities to establish 
themselves . . . .” (citing Catherine Greene Burnett et al., In Pursuit of Independent, Qualified, 
and Effective Counsel: The Past and Future of Indigent Criminal Defense in Texas, 42 S. TEX. L. 
REV. 595, 606 (2001))). 
 243 Fines, supra note 237, at 347–51. 
 244 Id. at 350–51. 
 245 Id. at 344–47. 
 246 See supra text accompanying notes 22, 91–93. 
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already waived their rights, just as a criminal defense attorney may be of 
limited assistance to the defendant who, misunderstanding his own 
rights, has already made self-incriminatory statements, or otherwise 
opted to confess to the charged crime.247 
A related concern is when children have already been taken away, 
and placed in foster care. Once the children are settled in foster care, 
CPS and the courts may impose conditions for the return of the 
children, and those conditions may involve considerable 
micromanagement of the parents’ parenting style.248 Protection of 
parents’ rights over the care and custody of the children, therefore, 
requires intervention by competent counsel before removal. Once the 
children are removed, it is too easy for the system to dictate terms in 
derogation of parents’ discretion over their children’s upbringing, to 
substitute the judgment of CPS or the judicial officer for the judgment 
of the parents on how best to parent the children.249 Moreover, even a 
temporary removal is an enormous imposition on parents’ 
constitutionally protected interests;250 absent an emergency, even a 
temporary removal should not be effected until parents have counsel to 
protect their rights. 
Paul Chill has written compellingly about “the tendency of 
emergency child removal decisions—by social workers, police officers, 
and judges—to become self-reinforcing and self-perpetuating in 
subsequent child protective proceedings. This snowball effect, as one 
court has referred to it, is widely acknowledged by lawyers who practice 
in juvenile court.”251 Once removed, it can be very difficult to obtain the 
return of the children to their parents. Chill observed in 2004: 
Twenty years ago, an American Bar Association study reported that 
“experienced litigators” in child protection cases found it difficult to 
get children returned home “once removed, whether the original 
removal was appropriate or not.” More recently, one such litigator 
 
 247 See supra text accompanying notes 225–31(discussing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 
(1966)). 
 248 Fines, supra note 123. 
Once a child is removed, a variety of factors converge to make it very difficult for 
parents to ever get the child back. One court has referred to this as the “snowball 
effect.” The very focus of court proceedings changes—from whether the child should 
be removed to whether he or she should be returned. As a practical matter, the 
parents must now demonstrate their fitness to have the child reunited with them, 
rather than the state having to demonstrate the need for out-of-home placement. 
Paul Chill, Burden of Proof Begone: The Pernicious Effect of Emergency Removal in Child 
Protective Proceedings, 42 FAM. CT. REV. 540, 542 (2004) (citation omitted). 
 249 Chill, supra note 248; Fines, supra note 123. 
 250 See supra text accompanying notes 144–47 (discussing how investigations and temporary 
removals can do tremendous harm to the children too). 
 251 Chill, supra note 248, at 540. 
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put it this way: “Possession is nine-tenths of the law. Children who 
are with their parents at the beginning of a child protective 
proceeding are likely to remain at home; children who have been 
removed are likely to remain in governmental custody for a long 
time, even years.” One clinical law professor has labeled this 
phenomenon “tracking”—as in “a train getting on a track and 
continuing to move down that track no matter what.” And one 
nationally known jurist has written that issuance of an ex parte 
removal order, “in so many cases, is indeed the ball game.”252 
The lesson here is that if parents’ rights to the care, custody, and 
control of their children can be meaningfully protected only if the 
parents can keep custody of their kids from the outset. “By seizing 
physical control of the child, the state tilts the very playing field of the 
litigation. The burden of proof shifts, in effect if not in law, from the 
state to the parents.”253 If the parents do not get counsel until after the 
dislocation has occurred, their rights have already been seriously 
compromised. “[T]he 1997 federal Adoption and Safe Families Act 
(ASFA) . . . converts every day that a child spends in foster care into one 
more tick of the clock in a countdown toward termination of parental 
rights.”254 
In order to protect the parents’ rights, therefore, the provision of 
counsel will be required at the time the first removal is attempted, long 
before it is known whether the state will ultimately seek termination. 
That suggests a lower threshold for the appointment of counsel than 
exists in many states and, possibly, in any state. If the right to counsel 
accrues only when the state files to terminate parental rights, the advice 
of counsel is likely to be far too late to ensure the protection of parents’ 
rights. As noted above, it appears that many cases are resolved without 
any hearing at all, with parents merely capitulating to the demands of 
 
 252 Id. at 543 (citing, inter alia, DIANE DODSON, AMERICAN BAR ASS’N, THE LEGAL 
FRAMEWORK FOR ENDING FOSTER CARE DRIFT: A GUIDE TO EVALUATING AND IMPROVING 
STATE LAWS, REGULATIONS, AND COURT RULES 3-1 (1983); David J. Lansner, Representing 
Respondents in Child Protective Proceedings, in CHILD ABUSE, NEGLECT AND THE FOSTER CARE 
SYSTEM, 1998: EFFECTIVE SOCIAL WORK AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 583 (Practising Law Inst. ed., 
1998); Janet Weinstein, And Never the Twain Shall Meet: The Best Interests of Children and the 
Adversary System, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 79, 115–16 (1997)). 
 253 Chill, supra note 248, at 542. 
 254 Id. at 540. The referenced legislation was designed to make it easier for foster parents to 
adopt the foster children entrusted to them.  
ASFA generally requires states, as a condition of receiving federal funds, to file for 
termination of parental rights with respect to any child who remains in foster care for 
15 out of 22 consecutive months. . . . Under ASFA, parental rights can now be 
terminated, or at least gravely threatened, on the basis of the mere passage of time. 
Id. at 546 (citations omitted). 
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CPS, whatever they are, in order to ensure they can keep custody of 
their children.255 
D.     Rights to a Hearing When Children Are Removed 
As mentioned above, removals constitute not only a deprivation of 
liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment, but also a seizure under the 
Fourth Amendment.256 Under County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, the 
hearing must be held within 48 hours of seizure.257 In some respects, the 
short time frame for the hearing is an important protection of the 
parents’ rights, because it ensures that they get judicial review of the 
removal promptly. On the other hand, that is very little time to prepare 
for a hearing where so much is at stake, even if the parents have 
counsel.258 Chill explains how it works in practice: 
[T]he state ordinarily must provide notice and a hearing before 
forcibly separating a parent and child. Courts have held that only an 
imminent danger to a child’s life or health can justify removal of the 
child without notice and a hearing first. Even then, a prompt 
postremoval hearing must be held. 
In practice, however, children are seldom removed on anything but 
an emergency basis—either unilaterally, without a court order, or on 
the basis of some form of ex parte judicial authorization. . . . 
[D]ue process requires a prompt postremoval hearing even when 
summary removal is justified. Yet these hearings are often shams. 
They may be extremely brief, lasting 1 hour or less. Lawyers for 
parents and children, moreover, if there even are any at this point, 
may have barely had a chance to meet their clients, much less to 
investigate the state’s evidence of imminent danger and prepare a 
cogent response. Thus, the prospect of quickly undoing an 
unnecessary emergency removal is fanciful at best in most cases.259 
The upshot is that it is extremely difficult to provide adequate 
protection for parents’ rights in these proceedings. Without effective 
and timely representation for the parents at this stage, there can be little 
hope that the constitutional rights of parents, whose parenting has come 
into question, will get adequate consideration. 
 
 255 See supra text accompanying notes 91–92. 
 256 GUGGENHEIM & SANKARAN, supra note 90, at 36. 
 257 Cty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991). 
 258 For the reasons set forth in the preceding sections, the parents typically will have no right 
to counsel at this stage in the proceedings, and may well be appearing pro se. 
 259 Chill, supra note 248, at 541, 544 (citations omitted). 
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E.     Conclusions on Procedural Rights 
The mechanics of attorney appointment, and what limits can or 
should be imposed on CPS’s investigations in order to accord adequate 
respect for parental judgments regarding their children’s activities and 
levels of supervision, will need to be worked out. This Article’s purpose 
is neither to spell out the details of such a system, nor to suggest that 
implementation will be easy. However, the provision of counsel at a 
meaningful stage in the process may be critical to protecting the rights 
of parents. 
Of course, Mr. Meitiv initially refused to sign anything until he 
could consult with an attorney, and the demand for an attorney availed 
him nothing. The CPS worker simply threatened to take his kids unless 
he signed away his right to follow his own parenting judgment,260 and 
by so doing, effectively coerced him into waiving that right.261 So in this 
case, at least, even someone who can afford an attorney, and who asks 
for one up front, was largely powerless to assert his constitutional rights. 
Hopefully, a broader recognition of procedural rights of parents will 
serve as a check on such bullying and intimidation of parents; otherwise, 
the substantive Fourteenth Amendment rights of Mr. Meitiv, and of 
every parent in America to control the care and custody of their 
children, have little force or meaning. 
VI.     THE CHILLING OF PARENTAL RIGHTS 
It may appear that the anecdotal reports of state interventions in 
free-range families are exceptional. Indeed, the fact that several of these 
cases have received significant publicity is by no means evidence that 
such state interventions are common. There are no good statistics on 
how frequently these arrests and interventions occur for parents who 
are, for whatever reason—parenting philosophy, resource limitations, 
culture, etc.—engaged in some type of free-range parenting; the 
evidence comes anecdotally, mostly from news reports. But the publicity 
given to recent highly-publicized cases, where parental rights were given 
so little respect by state authorities, is certain to chill the exercise of 
parental rights across the nation. The nightmare scenario of uniformed 
officers appearing on one’s doorstep and threatening to take the 
children away is like a scene from Sophie’s Choice.262 
 
 260 St. George, supra note 1. 
 261 See discussion of coercion and involuntary waiver, in the context of the Vaughn case, 
supra text accompanying notes 96–97. 
 262 In the movie, Nazis confronted a mother of two children as she was being inducted into 
the concentration camp at Auschwitz, and asked her which child she wanted to keep, because 
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As noted above, parents are unlikely to challenge the authorities 
and assert their rights in these situations, opting instead to plead for 
mercy in the desperate hope of keeping custody of their own children. 
Thus, the rights are neither vindicated in the individual case, nor 
defined by case law for future guidance to parents and state actors. 
But parents, reading the news stories, will learn the powerful lesson 
that they cannot trust their own judgment about what is best for their 
children. They must now parent in a manner that respects the popular 
paranoia about child safety. If any busybody in the neighborhood is 
likely to disapprove of one’s free-range or long-leash parenting 
practices, the parent can no longer pursue those practices, or otherwise 
rely on his or her own instincts on how best to parent a child in a 
potentially dangerous world. The fear of state intervention will certainly 
chill the exercise of these parental rights, undermining constitutionally 
protected family autonomy and, in all likelihood, the children’s own 
interest. 
CONCLUSION 
As the legal system is targeting parents and parenting, applying 
ever more demanding standards for child safety, it is vital that the 
constitutional rights of parents be better defined and safeguarded. The 
“best interest of the child” standard must never be applied to condemn a 
parenting choice, at least when the parents are not found to be unfit and 
where parents are in agreement with each other over the parenting 
decision. Courts should recognize those parents’ constitutional rights 
and powers and give a large measure of deference to parents’ 
prerogatives in deciding how to raise their children—akin to the 
business judgment of corporate directors. At the same time, states 
should take care to ensure that parents’ procedural rights are protected, 
primarily through affording a right to counsel early in the proceedings. 
Second-guessing by the state will otherwise undermine the family, and 
ultimately harm the children. 
Free-range parenting, like any theory of parenting, may or may not 
withstand the test of time or survive in the marketplace of ideas.263 But 
unless parents are allowed to trust their own judgment on these issues, 
to make these decisions without fear of state intervention, the 
 
they were going to take the other one away. If she refused to choose, they would take both 
children. SOPHIE’S CHOICE (Incorporated Television Company & Keith Barish Productions 
1982). 
 263 Robert Putnam, in his article Still Bowling Alone, suggests that the sense of community 
may be making a comeback in the post-9/11 era. The rise of the free-range parenting movement 
also suggests the start of a backswing of the pendulum. Sander & Putnam, supra note 32. 
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marketplace of ideas, as applied to parenting, will be effectively shut 
down. Then only one type of parenting—state-approved overprotective 
parenting—will be permitted: parents can either conform to the state-
approved approach or risk the heavy-handed retribution from state 
authorities. That situation is the natural consequence if the state 
undervalues parental rights and prerogatives and applies instead a de 
facto “best interest” standard to justify interventions in families. 
The alternative, more consistent with American constitutional 
values, is to strengthen and safeguard the family from external second-
guessing. The Fourteenth Amendment protections should be sufficient 
to do this, as any action by the state in derogation of a parent’s rights 
should be subjected to strict scrutiny and struck down unless it is the 
“least restrictive means” of protecting that child from genuine harm. But 
it may also be helpful to think in terms of a “parental judgment rule” 
modeled on the law of fiduciaries or other protections for parental 
discretion. Finally, parents need representation, lest they waive their 
rights to parent as they see fit in a desperate but understandable effort to 
keep custody of their own children. States need to provide parents with 
counsel and to advise them of this right, at the outset, certainly in time 
for parents to be represented at the first removal hearing. Otherwise, the 
parents’ constitutional rights will remain unasserted, unadjudicated, and 
unrecognized. 
If the state authorities and the courts are going to get this right, 
they need to respect parents’ constitutional liberty interests and 
approach any intervention in the family knowing that their actions are 
subject to strict scrutiny. State interventions in the family should be 
viewed with skepticism, as they violate the “sanctity of the family”264 and 
threaten “the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their 
children . . . perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests 
recognized by [the Supreme Court].”265 Only if strict scrutiny is applied 
to such intervention can parents get the breathing space, i.e., the 
discretion, they need to parent as they see fit, and to do it without fear). 
By strengthening the family, the state’s legitimate objectives to promote 
the welfare of children are better served; after all, the ultimate 
beneficiaries of these constitutional guarantees are not so much the 
parents but the children themselves. 
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 265 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); see also Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 
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